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INTRODUCTION
Across the country, survivors of domestic violence are leaving court
with what often amounts to false assurances as well as illusory custody
and parenting time orders.  For many survivors, these rulings, which
are part and parcel of domestic violence protection rulings, are the
only court orders they will obtain regarding the care of their children.
These rulings  set forth a vital structure for how children will be raised
and create concrete expectations for parents and children alike.  In-
creasingly, however, it is becoming evident that these parenting and
custody orders are challenging, if not impossible, to enforce, leaving
survivors with false hope and ill-placed reliance.
In all fifty states and the District of Columbia, victims of domestic
violence can seek civil protection orders1 that direct the abusive party
1. Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence Protection
Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1042–43, 1093–98 (2014) (“By 1993, each state had enacted a
protection order statute.”); Domestic Violence, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 369, 409 (Sarah Lor-
raine Solon ed. 2009) (“All fifty states and the District of Columbia permit Domestic Violence
Victims to petition the court for civil protection orders.”).
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to refrain from further violence2 and adjudicate custody and visita-
tion.3  If parties share a child, the court may resolve issues of physical
and legal custody for the duration of the order in an expedited hear-
ing.4  Because domestic relations cases that adjudicate long-term cus-
2. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(b)(1) (2011) (stating that a court may prohibit a defendant
from abusing the plaintiff, children, or any person indicated in the civil protection order); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2012) (permitting a court to “order the re-
spondent to refrain from abusing or threatening to abuse any person eligible for relief”); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2015) (stating that a court may grant an order
that “directs the respondent to refrain from abusing. . . family or household members”); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.022(b)(5) (West 2014) (noting that with the issuance of a protective order,
a court may order the defendant to refrain from committing acts of family violence, which in-
clude acts causing physical injury, against the plaintiff); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(A)(2)
(2010) (stating that when the court issues a protection order, the order may prohibit the respon-
dent from committing acts of abuse or acts that may otherwise injure petitioner).
3. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(c) (2011); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(9) (2014); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-15-205(a)(3)(A) (2009); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6340(a) (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-
105(1)(e) (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15(b) (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(5)
(2013); D.C. CODE §§ 16-1005(c)(6)–(7) (2013); FLA. STAT. § 741.30(6)(a)(3) (2015); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-13-4(a)(4) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-5.5(a) (2006); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/
214(b)(5)–(7) (2010); IOWA CODE § 236.5(1)(b)(5) (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(4)
(West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136(A)(3) (2015); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A,
§ 4007(1)(G) (2015); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 4-506(d)(7)–(8) (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 209A, § 3(d) (2014); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(6)(a)(4) (2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-
15(2)(a)(iv) (2013); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 455.050(3)(1)–(2) (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.030
(2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173-B:5(I)(b)(5)–(6) (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29
(b)(3), (11) (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(A)(2) (2013); N.Y. FAM. COURT LAW § 842
(McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50B-3(a)(4), (1) (20015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-
02(4)(c) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(d) (LexisNexis 2015); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 107.718(1)(a), (3) (2015); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108(a)(4) (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-
60(C)(1) (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-5.3 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606(a)(6)
(2014); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.021(3); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-7-106(2)(f), (3)(b) (Lexis-
Nexis 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1103(c)(2)(C)–(D) (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
279.1(A)(8) (2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.060(1)(d) (2014); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-503(3)
(2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105(b)(i) (2013).  In some states, courts are authorized to adju-
dicate only the issue of custody, not parenting time. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6306(1)(a)
(2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1)(f) (West 2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924(1)(f)
(2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(a)(3) (2013).
4. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.30(5)(c) (permitting the court to order a full hearing within fif-
teen days of the issuance of an ex parte temporary injunction); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 4
(stating that when a court grants a temporary order of protection to a petitioner, the court must
hold a full hearing within ten days); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(D)(2)(a) (noting that if
the court grants a protection order to the petitioner during an ex parte hearing, the court must
hold a full hearing within seven days); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-402(e)(1) (stating that if the magis-
trate issues an order, the family court must hold a hearing “on the matter” within ten days).  One
study concluded that almost 57% of ex parte plaintiffs in protection order cases share a child in
common. N.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ANALYSIS CTR., N.C. GOVERNOR’S CRIME COMM’N, SYSTEM
STATS: DISPOSITIONAL OUTCOMES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EX-PARTE AND DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE PROTECTIVE ORDERS 4 (2002), https://www.nccrimecontrol.org/div/GCC/systemstats/win-
ter02.pdf.  Another study concluded that rural women were more likely than their urban
counterparts to share children with their abuser. T.K. LOGAN ET AL., THE KENTUCKY CIVIL
PROTECTIVE ORDER STUDY: A RURAL AND URBAN MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE STUDY OF PROTEC-
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tody and visitation are time-intensive, and because many parents with
children never even seek court intervention to resolve custody, this
expedited relief can be essential to the safety of domestic violence
victims and to the well-being and stability of children during this cha-
otic time for a family.5
In the best-case scenario, a party subject to a protection order will
comply with the order, but ample evidence has shown that protection
orders are frequently violated6 despite the hopes of the petitioner and
the court.  Protection orders can be enforced in a variety of ways.
Statutes across the country characterize the violation of a protection
order as a misdemeanor.7  Orders can also be enforced through crimi-
nal or civil contempt actions.8  When the violation of the order in-
volves violence or nonpayment of a monetary obligation, this
enforcement system can be effective.  Government prosecutors may
TIVE ORDER VIOLATION CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES, AND COSTS 86 (2009), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228350.pdf; Nikki Hawkins, Perspectives on Civil Protective
Orders in Domestic Violence Cases: The Rural and Urban Divide, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS: NAT’L
INST. JUST. (2010), http://www.nij.gov/journals/266/pages/perspectives.aspx. . . States authorize
protection orders that last for varying lengths of time. See Stoever, supra note 1, at 1046–50, R
1049 fig.1 (analyzing data illustrating that the average duration of a protection order is one year).
5. See Suzanne Reynolds & Ralph Peeples, When Petitioners Seek Custody in Domestic Vio-
lence Court and Why We Should Take Them Seriously, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 935, 940–50
(2012) (based on empirical data noting that “many families experiencing violence and custody
issues never made it to family court; they were in domestic violence court instead”).
6. See, e.g., ANDREW R. KLEIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NIJ SPECIAL REPORT NO. 225722,
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH: FOR LAW ENFORCE-
MENT, PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES 57 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225722.pdf
(finding varying violation rates for protection orders—“ranging from 23 percent over two years,
35 percent within six months, to 60 percent within twelve months, and in between at 48.8 percent
within two years”); TK LOGAN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, GRANT NO. 2005WGBX0008,
THE KENTUCKY CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER STUDY: A RURAL AND URBAN MULTIPLE PERSPEC-
TIVE STUDY OF PROTECTION ORDER VIOLATION CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES, AND COST 97
(2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228350.pdf (concluding that 50% of protection
orders were violated); Melissa Jeltsen, These Abusers Aren’t Allowed To Own Guns.  So Why
Aren’t States Removing Them?, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/14/
domestic-violence-guns-restraining-orders_n_5982774.html (last updated Oct. 24, 2014, 5:59 PM)
(citing Brian H. Spitzberg, The Tactical Topography of Stalking Victimization and Management,
TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 261–288 (2002)) (revealing research indicating that “restraining
orders are violated around 40 percent of the time”).
7. See infra note 31 and accompanying text (e.g., Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware and R
Minnesota).
8. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5A-3 (2010) amended & republished as § 13A-6-142 (2011); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1046; FLA. STAT. § 741.30(9)(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-6 (2010); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 60/223 (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2137; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(B)
(2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606(a)(8).  All of these statutes set forth both criminal and civil
contempt enforcement remedies.  Civil and criminal contempt actions can also be brought ab-
sent statutory authorization as equitable actions. See Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Con-
tempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345, 351-53 (2000) (describing various categories of contempt actions
and their use as actions in equity).
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enforce orders criminally when the respondent violates the order by,
for example, assaulting or threatening the petitioner, especially when
the violation can be corroborated.9  The enforcement system also
functions somewhat effectively when a party fails to meet a concrete
obligation, such as making a payment or surrendering documents.  Af-
ter this type of breach, an aggrieved party can bring a civil contempt
action to coerce compliance with that obligation.
However, enforcement is far more problematic when the violation
involves custody of a child or a visitation provision of a protection
order.10  Legally, the actors who hold the power to criminally enforce
the no assault and no harassment provisions of the order also have the
power to enforce the domestic relations provisions of the order.  How-
ever, in practice, the power to enforce those remedies through crimi-
nal actions is often declined or elusive, leaving the provisions
themselves with minimal significance.11  Protected parties, conse-
quently, have been misled into thinking that they have been granted
something of value.
Civil enforcement is similarly problematic in this context.  Civil con-
tempt cases often do not offer remedies that can compensate the ag-
grieved party for her12 losses.  At the same time, those remedies that
9. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-3384, at ¶ 3 (Ct. App.) (involving the prosecution for
violation of a protection order based on a felony assault); State v. Weaver, 2002 S.D. 76, ¶ 3, 648
N.W.2d 355, 357 (per curiam) (involving a defendant who violated a protection order by assault-
ing the victim).  Statistics supporting this claim are unavailable because jurisdictions fail to keep
records of the type of allegations related to enforcement actions.  In this Article, I do not discuss
the willingness of the police to enforce protection orders, which is notoriously problematic. See,
e.g., Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1097–98 (10th Cir. 2004) (considering a case
in which the police failed to enforce a protection order against a father who kidnapped and later
murdered his children), rev’d, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).  Instead, I discuss only the prosecution and its
willingness to enforce a protection order for a violent violation.
10. Once again, due to lack of record keeping on this issue, data are unavailable to support
this claim.  However, anecdotal evidence gathered from practitioners across the country sup-
ports the claim that prosecutors’ offices are far more likely to pursue violent breaches of protec-
tion orders and nonpayment of child support within protection orders than parenting time
breaches. See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (discussing how prosecutors are reluc- R
tant to take on violations of protective orders).
11. See Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1109 (stating that the failure to provide a holder of a protection
order the right to enforcement “render[s] domestic abuse restraining orders utterly valueless”).
12. In this Article, I generally refer to those who receive protection orders by the feminine
pronoun and the respondents by a masculine pronoun.  This choice is not intended to suggest
that all recipients of protection orders—or recipients of sole legal custody—are women and that
all respondents or those who breach court orders granting custody and visitation are men.  These
gender pronouns merely align with the statistics regarding protection orders and allow for more
consistency in describing scenarios. See MATTHEW J. BREIDING ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE SURVEILLANCE: UNIFORM DEFINI-
TIONS AND RECOMMENDED DATA ELEMENTS 1 (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
pdf/intimatepartnerviolence.pdf (finding that one in five women (about 29 million U.S. women)
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-3\DPL306.txt unknown Seq: 6 17-OCT-16 9:28
1006 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1001
are available may fail to adequately convey the seriousness of the
breach and fail to deter the contemnor from continuing violations.
This Article reveals the disconnect between the power and the will
to enforce the custody and parenting time provisions of protection or-
ders through criminal mechanisms, and it explores the further infir-
mity of civil enforcement by illustrating the shortcomings of available
relief.  Together, these barriers to effective enforcement threaten to
render this court-granted protection meaningless and dangerously
misleading.  The barriers also undermine the many years of advocacy
invested to secure these protections in the first place—reforms aimed
at protecting victims and children from abusive parents.13
These challenges to enforceability have been previously unrecog-
nized and unanalyzed.  Scholarship has been devoted to the general
value of protection orders in arresting violence in intimate relation-
ships.14  Others have considered the bewildering landscape of civil and
and one in seven men (about 16 million U.S. men) will experience intimate partner violence at
some point in their lifetime); MATTHEW J. BREIDING ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, PREVALENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, STALKING, AND INTI-
MATE PARTNER VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION—NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIO-
LENCE SURVEY, UNITED STATES, 2011, at 2 (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6308.pdf
(“22.3% of women and 14.0% of men [have experienced intimate partner violence]. . . .
[W]omen, in particular . . . are heavily impacted by [sexual violence, stalking, and intimate part-
ner violence] over their lifetime.”).
13. See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on
Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1064–71 (1991) (analyzing the law’s treatment
of domestic violence as it relates to custody and calling for courts to give weight to domestic
violence in analyzing the “best interest of the child” standard); Joan S. Meier, Domestic Vio-
lence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining So-
lutions, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 657, 661 (2003) (arguing that “[c]hildren’s safety
and well-being are often just as much at stake in litigation for civil protection orders” as in child
welfare cases on which more attention had been focused); Reynolds & Peeples, supra note 5, at
935–40 (discussing judges’ historic resistance to handling custody issues in the context of domes-
tic violence and the advocacy efforts to overcome that resistance).
14. See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence:
Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487,
1490, 1504–06 (2008) (explaining how civil protection orders can be an effective tool both when a
victim wants complete separation from her partner and when a victim wishes to tailor the order
to preserve the relationship); Kellie K. Player, Expanding Protective Order Coverage, 43 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 579, 589–91 (2012) (stating that protection orders remain an effective tool both for
preventing further domestic abuse as well as signaling to society at large that that violence is
culturally and morally unacceptable); Stoever, supra note 1, at 1021–22 (arguing that protection R
orders are so effective that victims of domestic violence should be entitled to protection orders
that last for the duration of the victim’s life). But see, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Battered
Women’s Substantive Due Process Claims: Can Orders of Protection Deflect Deshaney?, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1280, 1293 (1990) (explaining how protection orders can be ineffective because
law enforcement inconsistently enforces them, and they can often serve to further agitate the
abuser into hunting down and hurting his victim); Jenny Woodson, Sanctioned Indifference: Ad-
dressing Domestic Violence in the Courts and Beyond, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1037, 1041
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criminal contempt enforcement generally.15  Although these are im-
portant areas for scholarly analysis, these articles have left unexplored
the practical and legal barriers to enforcing the custody and parenting
time provisions of protection orders that threaten to render these pro-
visions meaningless.  This Article analyzes this phenomenon and ex-
plores ways to bring together the will and the power to enforce all
aspects of protection orders criminally and to shore up the relief avail-
able through civil contempt so that the family law provisions of pro-
tection orders are more than illusory.  In keeping with a recent thread
of domestic violence scholarship, this Article focuses on the ways by
which the hard-fought system reforms now fail to offer protection to
survivors in previously unforeseeable ways.16  However, this Article
pushes further by seeking to explore and resolve the lack of reliable
enforcement remedies in this area in a way that not only keeps survi-
vors safe but contemplates the important interests of children at issue
and the enhanced enforceability of civil injunctions generally.
In Part II, this Article presents the legal and practical context of this
issue.  The Article analyzes the three avenues available to enforce
family law remedies in protection orders, which  include criminal pros-
ecution as well as criminal and civil contempt.  Against that backdrop,
(2009) (stating that civil protection orders can be ineffective because they only minimally in-
crease the potential for arrest and often serve to further infuriate the abuser).
15. See, e.g., Robert H. Whorf, The Boundaries of Contempt: Must the Court’s Power Yield to
Due Process?, 46 R.I.B.J. 9, 10, 49–50 (1998) (arguing that criminal contempt can be an impor-
tant and necessary tool for courts but noting that it becomes problematic when penalties for
criminal contempt are not statutorily limited and can lead to overly severe penalties); Jacob R.
Fiddelman, Protecting the Liberty of Indigent Civil Contemnors in the Absence of a Right to
Appointed Counsel, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 431, 432, 453 (2013) (arguing that civil con-
tempt can be problematic because indigent contemnors are not entitled to publicly funded coun-
sel); Jennifer Fleischer, In Defense of Civil Contempt Sanctions, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
35, 38–39 (2002) (demonstrating the multiple opinions that exist within scholarship because con-
tempt remedies provide an effective tool for judges while simultaneously granting them too
much power and not providing civil contemnors with enough procedural protections); Paul A.
Grote, Note, Purging Contempt: Eliminating the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Con-
tempt, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1247, 1261–63, 1274 (2011) (arguing that the law surrounding con-
tempt remains overly complicated and that many individuals do not realize that they the risk
being found in contempt of court even outside of a courtroom).
16. See, e.g., LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A
SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 1 (2008) (de-
tailing the achievements of the battered women’s movement and the current unforeseen chal-
lenges presented); Hannah Brenner, Transcending the Criminal Law’s “One Size Fits All”
Response to Domestic Violence, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 301, 327–28 (2013) (arguing
that the criminal approach to domestic violence fails to adequately respond to all of a particular
victim’s needs or to the needs of all victims); Erin R. Collins, The Evidentiary Rules of Engage-
ment in the War Against Domestic Violence, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 397, 452–54 (2015) (critiquing the
ineffective and insufficient “one size fits all” model of criminalization that was initially advo-
cated by domestic violence advocates).
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the Article looks to a Washington, D.C. protection order action as a
case study that illustrates the unpredictability of custody and parent-
ing time relief in protection orders.17
Part III seeks to locate the nexus of power and the will to enforce
the domestic relations provisions of protection orders criminally by
looking specifically at the court, the prosecution, and protected par-
ties.  This Part considers the implications that the state actors, who
hold truly reliable power to enforce the family law remedies of the
order criminally, have either little incentive or are severely curtailed
in their ability.  In this Part, the Article also looks at civil contempt
actions, considering why the power to enforce domestic relations pro-
visions of protection orders through civil contempt often results in
foreclosed or ineffective remedies that fail to redress the violation.
Finally, this Part more broadly analyzes the enforcement, considering
whether the power to enforce other civil injunctions through criminal
mechanisms is equally elusive and whether civil contempt remedies
are similarly largely unresponsive.  This Part analyzes what makes the
enforcement of these provisions particularly complex and worthy of
consideration.18
Finally, in Part IV, the Article considers legal, procedural, and
structural mechanisms that could bring together the power and the
will to enforce domestic relations provisions of protection orders
through criminal contempt.  This Part also considers how to improve
existing forms of civil relief to make all aspects of protection orders
and domestic relations orders more meaningful and to render the
court’s promise of resolution real and concrete.  The legal and struc-
tural reforms analyzed in this Part seek to fortify the enforceability of
parenting time and custody relief in protection orders, but they also
have far-reaching implications for domestic violence, domestic rela-
tions, and civil injunction enforcement generally.19
II. LEGAL AND FACTUAL CONTEXT
Three legal mechanisms permit enforcement of protection orders,
which provide different relief and pose varying challenges for ag-
grieved parties.  This legal structure comes to life infra through a case
litigated in the District of Columbia, which illustrates the gaps in en-
forceability that arise when the legal rules and prosecutorial discretion
are applied in the context of an actual case.
17. See infra notes 34–66 and accompanying text. R
18. See infra notes 67–174 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 175–222 and accompanying text. R
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A. Three Avenues To Enforce Protection Orders
Criminal and civil contempt are two enforcement mechanisms that
the U.S. Supreme Court first distinguished in the early twentieth cen-
tury when it noted that criminal contempt cases are “prosecuted to
preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the courts and to pun-
ish for disobedience of their orders.”20  Criminal contempt punishes a
contemnor for violating a court order.  For example, if a father vio-
lates a custody provision of a civil protection order by enrolling a child
in a new school when the mother has been granted sole legal custody,
the mother could file for criminal contempt to punish the father for
violating the court order.  A criminal contempt action is designed to
vindicate the court’s authority.21  The threat of criminal contempt is
intended to deter future violations.22  To prevail in a criminal con-
tempt action, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the contemnor willfully violated a court order.23  If proven, the
contemnor may face jail time, a fine, or both.24  The distinction be-
tween criminal and civil contempt hinges on the remedy sought and
the purpose of the suit.25
A civil contempt action, on the other hand, is intended to protect,
enforce, and administer the rights and remedies that courts have set
forth.26  Civil contempt remedies seek to bring the contemnor into
compliance and to compensate the aggrieved party rather than to pun-
20. Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 328 (1904) (quoting In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448,
458 (8th Cir. 1902)).
21. Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); United States v. Schine,
260 F.2d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1958).
22. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 156 (stating that, based on a broad study of civil protection R
order enforcement, the effectiveness of the order depends on the respondent’s fear of
enforcement).
23. Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345, 353–54 (2000)
(“[Criminal contempt] requires a showing of willful disobedience of the court order.”).
24. Id. at 353; see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2137(A) (2014) (“Upon violation of a . . .
protective order, . . . the court may hold the defendant in contempt of court and punish the
defendant by imprisonment in the parish jail . . . or [impose] a fine.”); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 4-508(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2012) (stating that if an individual violates a civil protective or-
der, the violation may result in imprisonment or require the payment of fines); MINN. STAT.
§ 518B.01(f) (2014) (stating that if there has been a violation of a civil protective order, the court
may require the respondent to pay fines issued as a bond, and if the respondent does not comply,
then the court may place the respondent in jail).
25. In re Stewart, 571 F.2d 958, 963 (5th Cir. 1978) (reasoning that the purpose of relief is
determinative of the nature of contempt proceeding as criminal or civil); In re Marini, 28 B.R.
262, 265 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (distinguishing the two types of the contempt by analyzing
whether they seek to effectuate collection or uphold the court’s dignity).
26. In re Stewart, 571 F.2d at 963.
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ish for past violations.27  So, for example, if a mother were required by
a protection order to provide the petitioner-father with copies of birth
certificates and subsequently failed to do so, the father might pursue a
civil contempt suit to coerce the mother into compliance.  To prevail
in a civil contempt action, the plaintiff must prove the breach by clear
and convincing evidence.28  A contemnor, once convicted, can be sen-
tenced to jail time just like a criminal contempt contemnor.29  How-
ever, in a civil contempt case, the contemnor may be detained in jail
only until he comes into compliance, or, as courts have explained: “he
carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket.”30
Finally, all jurisdictions have created a separate statutory crime for
the violation of a protection order, constituting the third avenue by
which to enforce a protection order.31  In Mississippi, for example, a
statutory provision enables the government to bring a misdemeanor
prosecution for violation of the order.32  Like any ordinary criminal
case, the victim has a limited role in the prosecution and no right to
bring the action or to determine whether it is pursued.33
27. Morgan v. Barry, 596 F. Supp. 897, 899 (D.C. 1984) (reasoning that civil contempt exists as
a remedial sanction intended to coerce compliance with a court order or to compensate for
damages sustained as a result of noncompliance.); In re Marini, 28 B.R. at 265 (citing the com-
mon law distinction between types of contempt actions that seek to impose a fine to uphold the
court’s authority and those that seek to effectuate the judgment).
28. E.g., ME. R. CIV. P. 66(d)(2)(D) (noting that a party seeking a finding of contempt and a
remedial sanction must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the alleged contemnor
failed or refused to comply with a court order and presently has the ability to comply with that
order); MD. CODE ANN. R. SPEC. P. § 15-207 (permitting the court to make a finding of civil
contempt if the petitioner proves the matter by clear and convincing evidence).
29. Rawlings v. Rawlings, 766 A.2d 98, 116 (Md. 2001) (holding that a contemnor may be
incarcerated for civil contempt to coerce compliance but only if he has the present ability to
purge).
30. See, e.g., Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911) (quoting In re
Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902)).
31. Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic
Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1667 (asserting that, as of 2002, all fifty states and
Washington, D.C. had enacted statutes creating a separate statutory crime of violating a protec-
tion order); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-142(a) (2015) (stating that violating a protection order
can be a Class A misdemeanor); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-207(b)(1) (2013) (stating that violating
a protection order can be a Class A misdemeanor); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1046(h)–(i)
(2013) (stating that violating a protection order can be a Class A misdemeanor); MINN. STAT.
§ 518B.01(14)(b) (2015) (stating that violating a protection order can be prosecuted as a
misdemeanor).
32. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-21(1) (2014).
33. This Article will not methodically analyze the locus of power and will to enforce the provi-
sions of a protection order through a misdemeanor prosecution because only the government
holds that power.  The complications involving the deployment of that power are analogous to
the government’s prosecution for criminal contempt.
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B. The Problem in Context: The Washington, D.C. Case of
Watford-Cunningham v. Cunningham
The case of Watford-Cunningham v. Cunningham, which was liti-
gated in the District of Columbia, brings to life the problem identified
and interrogated in this Article.  In her complaint for a protection or-
der, Mrs. Cunningham alleged that her husband held her at gunpoint
in their bedroom for almost ninety minutes, chambering a round into
the barrel of the gun as he pressed it against her head.34  She further
alleged that, earlier that same year, he pinned her against a wall with
his forearm.35  She also reported that when she was at the hospital
with her sick child, Mr. Cunningham threatened to kill her.36
Mrs. Cunningham sought a protection order in Washington, D.C.
that directed Mr. Cunningham to not abuse her and to enroll in and
complete a counseling program for domestic violence.37  Because one
of their children was ill and needed a sterile environment, Mrs. Cun-
ningham could not take the children to a shelter despite feeling com-
pelled to do so based on her fear of Mr. Cunningham.  Therefore, she
asked the court to place the children with their father until she had
permanent, safe housing.38
The parties reached a settlement.  Mr. Cunningham agreed not to
assault his wife and to enroll in a counseling program.39  He agreed to
share joint legal and physical custody of the children with Mrs. Cun-
ningham,40 and the children would live with Mr. Cunningham for the
34. Petition & Affidavit for Civil Protection Order at 1, Watford-Cunningham v. Cunningham
(D.C. Sup. Ct. 2011) (No. 2011 CPO 0809) [hereinafter Watford-Cunningham Petition].
35. Id.
36. Supplemental Petition & Affidavit at 1, Watford-Cunningham (No. 2011 CPO 000809).
37. Id. at 2–3.
38. Cf. id. (requesting joint legal and physical custody).
39. Order of Protection at 1–3, Watford-Cunningham (No. 2011 CPO 000809).
40. Physical custody determines where a child will live, and legal custody determines who will
make vital parenting decisions about that child. E.g., D.C. CODE §§ 16-914(b)(i)–(ii) (2001)
(“‘legal custody’ means legal responsibility for the child. . . .  ‘physical custody’ means a child’s
living arrangements.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31 (2007) (“Sole legal custody” means “one
parent shall have the right and responsibility to make major decisions regarding the child’s wel-
fare,” and “Sole physical custody” means “a child shall reside with and be under the supervision
of one parent”).  This represents a somewhat unusual resolution of custody in a protection order
case.  In many jurisdictions, there is a presumption against joint custody when there is evidence
of domestic violence. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-131 (2011) (stating that when a court makes a
determination that there has been incidents of domestic violence, this raises a rebuttable pre-
sumption “that it is detrimental to the child and not in the best interest of the child to be placed
in .” the custody of the perpetrator); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B(5) (2006) (“There shall be a
presumption that joint custody is not in the best interests of a minor child if one (1) of the
parents is found by the court to be a habitual perpetrator of domestic violence . . . . ”); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A) (2008) (“There is created a presumption that no parent who has a history
of perpetrating family violence shall be awarded sole or joint custody of children.”).
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first six months of the year-long order.41  Under the order, Mr. Cun-
ningham was required to produce the children for visitation with Mrs.
Cunningham twice weekly for up to fourteen hours each week (for
seven hours on Tuesdays and seven hours on Sundays).42  The parties
set a court hearing for six months later to reassess custody.43
The visits did not go as planned.  Six months later, Mrs. Cunning-
ham testified that her husband had failed to produce the children for
visitation on any Sunday, resulting in twenty-six violations of the court
order.44  In response, the judge reminded Mr. Cunningham that the
order was valid:
it is my obligation to enforce an Order—a valid Order of this Court
as written.  And what is—what is written down in this Order is that
she’ll have visitation on Sunday[s] . . . .  [T]he Order is what it is
and—and he’s responsible for making the . . . children available
there at that time.45
After this warning, the judge asked if Mr. Cunningham would be able
to produce the children the following Sunday.46  Mr. Cunningham’s
counsel responded that Mr. Cunningham did not intend to produce
the children for visitation.47  In the face of this refusal, the judge re-
sponded: “All right, well, then I will entertain a motion for con-
tempt.”48  That day, Mrs. Cunningham filed a motion for criminal
contempt.49
Under D.C. law, a party may pursue criminal contempt of a protec-
tion order only through a public prosecutor or a private, court-ap-
pointed prosecutor.50  After reviewing the motion, the prosecutor’s
office declined to prosecute; they also did not initiate a misdemeanor
prosecution.51  The judge did not, himself, initiate contempt proceed-
41. See Order of Protection, supra note 39, at 1–3. R
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id.
44. Motion to Adjudicate Criminal Contempt, Watford-Cunningham (2011 CPO 000809); see
also Transcript of Hearing at 3, Watford-Cunningham (2011 CPO 000809) [hereinafter Septem-
ber Transcript].
45. September Transcript, supra note 44, at 9. R
46. Id.
47. Id. at 10.
48. Id.
49. Motion to Adjudicate Criminal Contempt, supra note 44.  In the District of Columbia, R
petitioners are empowered to file their own motions for criminal contempt seeking a fine or jail
time.  However, petitioners may not proceed on their own but must rely on the government to
prosecute the case. See infra notes 100–02 and accompanying text (discussing several cases R
which the court has held that a private right of action was permissible).
50. In re Robertson, 19 A.3d 751, 758 n.13, 759 & n.14 (D.C. 2011) (citing D.C. CODE § 23-101
(2001); SUPER. CT. DOM. V. R. 12(d)).
51. Transcript of Hearing at 3, Watford-Cunningham v. Cunningham (D.C. Sup. Ct. 2011)
(2011 CPO 809)  [hereinafter December Transcript].
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ings, which fully foreclosed Mrs. Cunningham’s use of the criminal
system as an enforcement mechanism.  Accordingly, Mrs. Cunning-
ham filed for civil contempt.52  At the hearing on the civil contempt
motion, the judge asked Mrs. Cunningham if she had seen her chil-
dren for visitation since they had last been in court.53  She informed
the court that she had approximately six Sunday visitations since she
had filed the initial motion for criminal contempt.54  In response, the
judge denied her motion because Mr. Cunningham was currently in
compliance.55  Mrs. Cunningham was baffled and dismayed.  She
asked for increased visitation moving forward to compensate her for
the more than 180 hours she had lost during the months Mr. Cunning-
ham refused to deliver the children for visitation.56  The judge as-
serted that the remedy she sought was inappropriate given that the
purpose of civil contempt is to compel current compliance.  The judge
explained that because Mr. Cunningham was now in compliance, the
judge was not “empowered to do anything in terms of the Civil Con-
tempt Motion.”57  He refused to provide any compensatory
visitation.58
According to allegations in the pleadings, Mr. Cunningham contin-
ued to violate the court order after that hearing.  Mrs. Cunningham
again filed for civil contempt, alleging that Mr. Cunningham violated
the joint legal custody provisions of the protection order by deciding
to enroll the children in schools without involving her in the decision
and by failing to provide her with access or documentation related to
the schools.59  She also alleged that he had unilaterally sought and
altered the children’s medical care—even for their ill child.60  Finally,
she alleged that he had violated a provision of the order that required
him to facilitate phone calls between Mrs. Cunningham and the chil-
dren on more than a dozen occasions in a one-month period.61  Again,
this motion went nowhere.  The court failed to ever hear arguments.
Ultimately, with no resolution in the Washington, D.C. courts, viola-
tions of the order, and after many months of very limited access to her
four young children, Mrs. Cunningham filed for custody in a different
52. See Motion to Adjudicate Civil Contempt, Watford-Cunningham (2011 CPO 809).
53. December Transcript, supra note 51, at 17. R
54. Id.
55. Id. at 19.
56. See id. at 17.
57. Id. at 17–18.
58. Id. at 19.
59. Motion to Adjudicate Civil Contempt at 78, Watford-Cunningham v. Cunningham (D.C.
Sup. Ct. 2011) (2011 CPO 809).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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jurisdiction where the judge granted her sole legal and physical
custody.
Mrs. Cunningham’s story captures elements of court experiences
shared by sizeable number of women seeking protection for them-
selves and their children.  As in Watford-Cunningham, protection or-
ders are subject to frequent violations,62 and unlawfully withholding
children from to domestic violence victims is a well-documented tactic
of abuse and control exercised by abusive partners.63  These survivors
find very little solace in court action.  The custody arrangements they
obtain in court seem to exist on paper only—barely recognized by the
courts.
What are the consequences of this type of breach and the subse-
quent lack of enforcement?  When a party violates the custody or visi-
tation provisions of a protection order, the court’s authority is
compromised, and the rights of the party to whom the remedy was
granted have been denied.  For the custody and parenting time provi-
sions to have value and for them to create tenable custodial arrange-
ments, their breaches must have consequences.  If a petitioner files a
valid motion to adjudicate criminal contempt that is later dismissed
for want of prosecution, the parent who has violated the order not
only escapes prosecution but may reasonably take away the message
that the legal system fails to take seriously both the violation and the
order.64  In the end, pursuing this type of remedy may result in em-
62. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing how protection orders are frequently R
violated).
63. See Mary Becker, Access to Justice for Battered Women, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 64,
89–90 (2003) (explaining how batterers use custody and visitation rights to turn their children
against the spouse who is the victim of domestic battery, making her look like the less competent
parent); Nina W. Tarr, The Cost to Children When Batterers Misuse Order for Protection Statutes
in Child Custody Cases, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 35, 43–48 (2003) (citing a situa-
tion in which a batterer made the custody hearing so confusing that the judge denied both par-
ties’ requests for sole custody of their children); Lundy Bancroft, Understanding the Batterer in
Custody and Visitation Disputes, LUNDY BANCROFT (1998), http://www.lundybancroft.com/arti-
cles/understanding-the-batterer-in-custody-and-visitation-disputes (stating that because batter-
ers are manipulative, they can normally earn investigators’ sympathies and coerce their children
to testify on their behalves).
64. See PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS:
LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 2, 49 (1990), https://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/123263NCJRS.pdf  (“[T]he effectiveness of civil protective orders de-
pends largely on their enforceability . . . .  Offenders may routinely violate orders, if they believe
there is no real risk of being arrested.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL SERIES BULLETIN #4:
ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS 1 (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/bulletins/
legalseries/bulletin4/ncj189190.pdf (“[Protection] orders are effective only when the restrained
party is convinced the order will be enforced. Unequivocal, standardized enforcement of court
orders is imperative if protective orders are to be taken seriously by the offenders they attempt
to restrain.”); see also Brenner, supra note 16, at 309 (noting that for a civil protection order to R
be effective and protect the petitioner, law enforcement must be willing to reinforce the protec-
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-3\DPL306.txt unknown Seq: 15 17-OCT-16 9:28
2016] THE FALSE PROMISE OF CUSTODY 1015
powering the parent in breach rather than deterring or punishing
him,65 leaving a victim open to continuing victimization.66
But, perhaps even more saliently, there is a long-term threat to the
well-being of the children and the family itself.  The custody and
parenting time provisions in a protection order are intended to resolve
critical issues for children whose parents can no longer safely and ef-
fectively communicate.  When the provisions are rendered meaning-
less, children and families lose the chance to have concrete
expectations for child care and child access.  Given these affronts to
the court, the protected party, and to the children at issue, the follow-
ing Part considers who holds the power and who has the will to en-
force the provisions as well as the limitations on that power and will.
III. ENFORCEMENT AND REMEDIES
Given what appears to be the ample availability of enforcement
remedies—in multiple formats—a litigant would reasonably expect
that the relief with which she leaves court is reliable.  Any law stu-
dents would read the doctrine to provide seemingly dependable meth-
ods of enforcement.  It is in practice that the criminal enforcement of
protection orders becomes elusive due to the disconnect between the
will and the power to enforce these provisions.  At the same time, the
relief promised in the civil context fails to effectively address the vio-
lation’s harm.
A. When Do the Power and the Will To Enforce Through
Criminal Contempt Coalesce?
Criminal contempt prosecution of a protection order violation may
well be the most effective enforcement mechanism to deter future vio-
lations and to protect the integrity of a court order,67 although this
tive order); Olivia M. Fritsche, Note, The Role of Enticement in a Violation of a Protection Or-
der, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1473, 1475 (2014) (“[A protective] order must be fully and
rigorously enforced in order to protect a woman who is the victim of an abusive relationship.”).
65. See generally LOGAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 156 (stating that, based on a broad study of R
Civil Protection Order enforcement, the effectiveness of the order depends on the respondent’s
fear of enforcement).
66. One commentator suggested that a judge’s decision to appoint a private prosecutor should
be determined based on whether the “government’s decision not to file a justifiable criminal
charge leaves the victim vulnerable to revictimization.”  Kenneth L. Wainstein, Comment, Judi-
cially Initiated Prosecution: A Means of Preventing Continuing Victimization in the Event of
Prosecutorial Inaction, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 727, 732 (1988).
67. See Livingston, supra note 23, at 373 (“Without criminal contempt, trial courts will find it R
difficult, if not impossible, to ensure respect of their orders and to provide redress ‘to those who
have sought the court’s protection’” (quoting United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 743 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part))); David M. Zlotnick, Empower-
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action is not without myriad potential complications for the contem-
nor-parent and the family.68  Yet custody and parenting time provi-
sions are rarely the subject of criminal contempt prosecution.  The
various entities and individuals potentially involved in a criminal con-
tempt prosecution for the breach of a protection order have varying
degrees of incentive and will to pursue criminal contempt in this
context.
1. The Court’s Enforcement Power and Will
Judges’ power to criminally enforce protection orders is con-
strained, making them unlikely to move criminal enforcement actions
forward without prosecutorial cooperation.  U.S. Supreme Court pre-
cedent69 as well as federal70 and state law71 all provide that courts
hold an inherent authority to enforce their orders, which encompasses
initiation of contempt proceedings.  This power includes the authority
to enforce orders in the face of violations that take place outside of
the court’s view.  The power to initiate criminal contempt cases has
been deemed critical to the administration of justice.72  As the U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged, courts must hold this power because
ing the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal Contempt Sanctions To Enforce Civil Protection
Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1155, 1201–02 (1995) (arguing that “criminal contempt sanctions
offer significant advantages and flexibility when incorporated into a comprehensive attack on
domestic violence” because they provide faster, more efficient, and more effective methods of
enforcing protection orders). But see Mili Patel, Note, Guarding Their Sanctuary on the Offense:
Criminal Contempt Actions by Domestic Violence Victims in Private Capacity, 18 CARDOZO J.L.
& GENDER 141, 167 (2011) (arguing that because enforcement of protection orders is not consis-
tent, “civil contempt is not sufficient both to vindicate a court’s authority and protect the legally
recognized rights of the order’s beneficiary in addition to the public interest in enforcement of
particular orders”).
68. See infra notes 149–217 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the collateral conse- R
quences of criminal enforcement for fathers and the family in general.
69. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012) (“[I]t is long settled that courts possess inherent authority to initi-
ate contempt proceedings for disobedience to their orders . . . . ”); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co.,
194 U.S. 324, 338 (1904); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 596, 600 (1895).
71. Margaret M. Mahoney, The Enforcement of Child Custody Orders by Contempt Remedies,
68 U. PITT. L. REV. 835, 854 (2007); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.31(3) (2015) (stating that the
court should initiate contempt proceedings if the state fails to act); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 252
(2015) (noting that the court can initiate contempt proceedings); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 8-6-1
(2012) (conferring on the court the right to punish contempts); State v. Murray, 623 A.2d 60, 62
(Conn. 1993) (agreeing that, separate and apart from statutory authority, courts have the inher-
ent power to punish disobedience of a court order outside of the judge’s presence); In re Price,
645 A.2d 488, 489 (R.I. 1994) (“[T]his court is of the opinion that these statutes confer . . . [on
the court] broad powers to initiate contempt proceedings . . . . ”).
72. E.g., Young, 481 U.S. at 795 (citing Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chi., St. Paul Min-
neapolis & Omaha Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65–66 (1924)).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-3\DPL306.txt unknown Seq: 17 17-OCT-16 9:28
2016] THE FALSE PROMISE OF CUSTODY 1017
they “cannot be at the mercy of another Branch in deciding whether
such proceedings should be initiated.”73
Despite this seemingly clear enforcement power, courts appear to
deploy this power to initiate criminal contempt actions quite spar-
ingly.  By way of example, in the District of Columbia, where criminal
enforcement power by the court is not codified, judges are clearly
aware that they hold this power because they regularly exercise it in a
narrow context.  If a respondent fails to enroll in a court-ordered pro-
gram, such as domestic violence intervention, the judge will issue a
show-cause order74 to force the respondent to answer to the violation
and remedy it.75  However, advocates cannot recall a single case in
which the court has exercised that authority in response to any other
alleged violations of protection order provisions.76  In Kansas, as an-
other example, courts are authorized by statute to issue a show-cause
order and conduct a contempt hearing.77  However, advocates in Kan-
sas report that they have never seen Kansas courts deploy this
power.78
The court’s will to initiate contempt proceedings might well be
dampened by the complications of deploying this power.  First, the
power to initiate contempt proceedings casts the judge in a potentially
untenable position in that this power vests the court with the authority
to charge and define the crime and, in some jurisdictions, then to adju-
dicate the alleged violation of its own order.79  As Justice Scalia noted
73. Id. at 796.
74. For an overview of the tool and procedure related to a show cause order, see Margaret
Martin Barry, Protective Order Enforcement: Another Pirouette, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 339,
359 (1995); and Lina Guillen, What Is a Show Cause Hearing in Family Court, DIVORCENET,
http://www.divorcenet.com/resources/divorce/divorce-basics/what-show-cause-hearing-family-
court (last visited Jan. 23, 2016); MINN. CIV. PRAC. § 17.10 (2015).
75. See, e.g., In re Jackson, 51 A.3d 529, 532–33 (D.C. 2012) (noting that the trial judge issued
a show cause order to defendant to explain why he had not enrolled in a counseling program as
required by a protection order).
76. See, e.g., E-mail from Megan M. Challender, Teaching Fellow, Georgetown Univ. Law
Ctr., to author (Aug. 11, 2015, 4:27 PM) (on file with author); E-mail from Deborah Epstein,
Dir., Domestic Violence Clinic, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., to author (Aug. 11, 2015, 4:47 PM)
(on file with author); E-mail from Jeanine Gomez, Legal Aid D.C., author (Aug. 11, 2015, 4:50
PM) (on file with author).
77. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-1204a (2007).
78. Brief & Appendix of Amicus Curiae Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment & Appeals
Project (DV LEAP) in Support of Neither Party at 13, In re Jackson, 51 A.3d 529 (No. 11-FM-
1123) [hereinafter Jackson Brief & Appendix of Amicus Curiae].
79. See Walker v. Bentley, 600 So. 2d 313, 325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that, in a
criminal contempt action, “[t]he judge also determines who should be prosecuted, and then tries,
convicts, and punishes”); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A
New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1066 (1993)
(“[C]ontempt law exacerbates the conflict by committing to the conflicted adjudicator the au-
thority not merely to find the facts but to define the offense, to initiate the enforcement proceed-
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in his concurrence in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils
S.A.:80 “In light of the broad sweep of modern judicial decrees, which
have the binding effect of laws for those to whom they apply, the no-
tion of judges’ in effect making the laws, prosecuting their violation,
and sitting in judgment of those prosecutions, summons forth . . . the
prospect of ‘the most tyrannical licentiousness.’”81  As such, judges
may shy away from using their power to pursue a criminal contempt
case without prosecutorial involvement.
In some jurisdictions, the court can proceed with the prosecution
even in the absence of a prosecutor.82  However, most jurisdictions
require that the government handle the prosecution and prohibit the
judge from moving forward sua sponte in the absence of public prose-
cution.83  Judges, therefore, might deploy their power to initiate con-
tempt infrequently because their power to see the case through is
constrained unless the prosecutor cooperates.  Although judges may
initiate contempt proceedings, they may not be able to assure that the
cases will be prosecuted.  After a court initiates a criminal contempt
case by issuing an order to showcause, the case must be prosecuted.
If the prosecution declines to pursue the case, the judge can appoint
a private prosecutor.84  As the Court stated in Young: “courts have
long had, and must continue to have, the authority to appoint private
attorneys to initiate such proceedings when the need arises.”85  How-
ever, that authority is constrained both legally and practically.  As set
forth in Young, the court must exercise that authority using the “least
possible power adequate to the end proposed”86 by appointing a pros-
ecutor who is disinterested.87  From a practical perspective, the court
may have difficulty identifying a private prosecutor who is willing to
ing, to determine the form and severity of the sanction, and, by the former choice, to fix what
procedural protections the defendant will receive.”).
80. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
81. Id. at 822 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 228
(1821)).
82. In these states, the hearing proceeds in an inquisitorial fashion.  For example, in Florida,
in a criminal contempt proceeding, a judge may move forward even in the absence of a prosecu-
tor or any other assistance. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.840(d).
83. See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 833 (1994)
(“Summary adjudication of indirect contempts is prohibited.”); In re Jackson, 51 A.3d at 538
(“[T]rial judges may initiate and preside over, but may not prosecute, a CPO indirect criminal
contempt proceeding in cases involving intrafamily offenses.”).
84. See generally Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution to Private Ac-
tors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 413 (2009) (analyzing the various ways the government dele-
gates prosecution to private prosecutors).
85. Young, 481 U.S. at 800–01.
86. Id. at 801 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319 (1975)).
87. Id. at 804.
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prosecute the case.  A private prosecutor must be compensated with
public funds or must be willing to handle the case without compensa-
tion.  Some jurisdictions designate public funding for this purpose.88
However, most jurisdictions do not have funds available to remuner-
ate private prosecutors.89
Courts appear to deploy this appointment power infrequently.
Looking to Washington, D.C. as an example, prosecutors review all
motions for criminal contempt filed in D.C courts and, of the 412 mo-
tions for criminal contempt filed in 2014, 144 were dismissed because
the government chose not to proceed, and the court declined to ap-
point a private prosecutor.90  In the four years that this procedure for
appointment has been in place, court personnel estimate that only a
handful of private prosecutors have been appointed.91  In Delaware,
advocates are unaware of any case involving the appointment of a pri-
vate prosecutor in this context.92 Although, judges enjoy the inherent
power to initiate criminal contempt cases, that power is constrained in
legal and practical ways that render criminal enforcement of most pro-
tection order provisions unlikely to be judicially initiated.
88. Fairfax, supra note 84, at 425–26.  Fairfax also noting that 26% of the U.S. prosecutors are R
part-time prosecutors who maintain private practices as well, raising concerns with some scholars
about conflicts of interest. See id. at 419 & n.24.
89. State courts have noted that this funding is not available at the state level. See, e.g., State
ex rel. O’Brien v. Moreland, 778 S.W.2d 400, 407 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (“No such funds are
appropriated to State courts.”); see also Musidor, B.V. v. Great Am. Screen, 658 F.2d 60, 65 (2d
Cir. 1981).
90. E-mail from Anonymous Personnel, Office of Attorney General, to author (June 22, 2014,
10:38 AM) (on file with author).  These statistics do not suggest that these 144 cases merited the
appointment of a private prosecutor.  However, it is reasonable to assume that a significant num-
ber of cases that actually had merit were declined.  Based on their data, seventy-four cases were
declined.  Those cases were based on conflicts then reviewed by the U.S. Attorney for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.  The U.S. Attorney’s office undertook prosecution in nine of those cases.
Several cases were withdrawn or settled, however, of those remaining, forty-one cases were
eventually dismissed for lack of prosecution.  Seperate statistics reveal that when the govern-
ment perceives that a case has little prosecutorial merit, it declines those cases under a separate
clarification.
91. E-mail from Anonymous Court Personnel, Superior Court of the District of Columbia
Domestic Violence Unit, to author (June 16, 2015, 3:44 PM) (on file with author).  Statistics from
the Office of the Attorney General in the District of Columbia also show that there was a private
prosecutor involved in only one case filed in 2014.
92. E-mail from Mariann Kenville-Moore, Interim Exec. Dir., Del. Coal. Against Domestic
Violence, to Rachel Leach, Research Assistant, George Washington Univ. School of Law (June
23, 2015, 11:28 AM) (on file with author) (stating that their office is not aware of any case in
which the court appointed a special prosecutor if the Attorney General’s Office failing to prose-
cute).  A deputy attorney general tasked with prosecuting criminal contempts of protection or-
ders in Hawaii similarly indicated he had never heard of a private prosecutor being appointed
for a criminal contempt case in which the government declined to prosecute.  E-mail from
Michael Kagami, Hawaii Deputy Attorney Gen., to Rachel Leach, Research Assistant, George
Washington Univ. School of Law (Aug. 13, 2015, 8:56 PM) (on file with author).
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2. The Prosecutor’s Power and Will
Prosecutors hold the power to enforce all provisions of a protection
order through criminal contempt.  When  a protection order is
breached, the prosecutor’s office can pursue a criminal contempt ac-
tion against a party who has violated a protection order; however,
there is no jurisdiction in which a prosecutor obligated to seek this
type of remedy.93
Prosecutorial discretion has problematic results for domestic vio-
lence survivors and their children who depend on the government to
give their protection orders meaning.  Prosecution units throughout
the country have limited resources and, therefore, must exercise their
discretion.  In doing so, prosecutors have historically been somewhat
reluctant to take on violations of protection orders generally94 and,
particularly, have been likely to decline cases involving the breach of
family law remedies.95  With limited resources,96 prosecutors ordina-
93. See, e.g., State v. Hankins, 686 P.2d 740, 744 (Ariz. 1984) (“It is clearly within the sound
discretion of the prosecutor to determine whether to file charges and which charges to file.”);
People v. Ramsey, 665 N.Y.S.2d. 501, 503 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (holding that a court may not overrule
a prosecutor’s decision regarding whether to pursue a criminal prosecution); State ex rel. Skinner
v. Dostert, 278 S.E.2d 624, 631 (W. Va. 1981) (“The duty to prosecute is qualified, however, in
that the prosecuting attorney is vested with discretion in the control of criminal causes . . . .
[T]he prosecutor in [her] discretion may decide which of several possible charges [she] will bring
against an accused.” (citations omitted)).
94. See United States ex rel. Vuitton v. Karen Bags, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 734, 744 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (“Realistically . . . aggrieved plaintiffs . . . cannot depend on the United States Attorney’s
Office to enforce the court’s mandates . . . . ”), rev’d sub nom. Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et
Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987); Jackson Brief & Appendix of Amicus Curiae, supra note 78, at 6 R
(“[The] enforcement of a civil order is simply not viewed by prosecutors—or anyone—as a
‘crime’ worthy of prosecution like other crimes.  These violations are understandably viewed by
law enforcement as minor ‘law violations’ rather than ‘real crimes’ requiring a criminal justice
response.”); Zlotnick, supra note 67, at 1209 (“Despite the wishes of . . . advocates, domestic R
violence does not behave like an ‘ordinary’ crime and prosecutors and police have legitimate
grievances about being forced to treat it as such.”); Wainstein, supra note 66, at 740 (noting that R
because prosecutors are under resourced and over worked, “they typically devote their scarce
resources to more serious crimes and more readily ignore charges perceived as less serious”).  In
Washington, D.C., prosecutors review all motions for criminal contempt.  Of those motions, the
prosecution pursues slightly more than 50% of the cases.  E-mail from Anonymous Personnel,
supra note 90. R
95. See Gordon v. State, 960 So. 2d 31, 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“Although an indirect
criminal contempt proceeding in a family law case is vitally important to the parties, such a case
often has little interest to a professional prosecutor.”); Jackson Brief & Appendix of Amicus
Curiae, supra note 78, at 7 (referring to telephone conversations with an advocate and a judge, R
which confirmed that public prosecutors’ offices are not primarily concerned with enforcement
of civil orders—particularly those that do not involve violence); Celia Guzaldo Gamrath, Visita-
tion Abuse v Unlawful Visitation Interference; Is there Comfort for Noncustodial Parents?, 91 ILL.
B.J. 450, 453 (2003) (“Some police and prosecutors still believe enforcement of visitation belongs
in family court and are reluctant to enforce the criminal statute.”).
96. Wainstein, supra note 66, at 738 (“Public prosecutors, however, often fail to prosecute R
these contempt cases because of their already overwhelming caseloads.”); e.g., Green v. Green,
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rily pursue violations involving violence, threats, or unwanted contact.
These violations are often more discrete and most likely easier to
prove.  As one prosecutor in New Mexico stated: “Violation of an Or-
der of Protection is a criminal statute and so [breaches] are prosecuted
criminally.  In my years spent prosecuting I never prosecuted an of-
fender for violating custody/visitation provisions of an [Order of
Protection].”97
3. The Protected Party’s Power and Will
If judges and prosecutors decline to enforce the protection order,
the aggrieved party is left to pursue enforcement on her own.  How-
ever, although they possess the will to enforce breached protection
order provisions, protected parties have the least access to enforce-
ment power.  The law governing whether beneficiaries of protection
orders can themselves initiate and prosecute cases for criminal con-
tempt against a defendant who has allegedly violated that order
widely varies across the nation often rendering the power opaque and
unreliable.  In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court—in an extensive dissent
to a one sentence opinion dismissing a writ of certiorari as improvi-
dently granted—considered this issue in Robertson v. United States ex
rel. Watson.98  The dissent analyzed the constitutionality of an Article
III court permitting a private party to prosecute criminal contempt in
a civil protection order case.99  The case, which was litigated in the
District of Columbia, involved beneficiaries of protection orders who
had been permitted to privately prosecute criminal contempt.100  Rea-
soning that “[o]ur entire criminal justice system is premised on the
notion that a criminal prosecution pits the government against the
governed, not one private citizen against another[,]” the dissent noted
that the private right of action was impermissible.101  The dissent
642 A.2d 1275, 1279 n.7 (D.C. App. 1994) (reporting at the time that the prosecuting authority in
D.C. “prosecute[d] less than 10 percent of the criminal contempt motions brought for violations
of protection orders” (quoting Brief for the Office of the Corporation Counsel as Amicus Cu-
riae, Green, 642 A.2d 1275); Wilson v. Wilson, 984 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Tenn. 1998) (discussing the
burden on prosecutors’ offices to merely enforce criminal laws).
97. E-mail from Lisa Weisenfeld, Policy Coordinator, N.M. Coal. Against Domestic Violence,
to Furqan Shukr (June 21, 2014, 9:04 PM) (on file with author).
98. Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 560 U.S. 272, 272 (2010) (per curiam).
99. Id. at 276–78.
100. Green, 642 A.2d at 1280–81 (holding that it is constitutionally permissible for an inter-
ested private party to prosecute a criminal contempt action).
101. Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 560 U.S. 272, 278 (2010) (per curiam) (Rob-
erts, C.J., dissenting).
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stated that any action for criminal contempt in a protection order case
must be brought in the name of the sovereign.102
The repercussions of Robertson are yet unknown because the case
fails to have precedential value given that it provided guidance only in
the form of a dissent to an opinion dismissing a writ.103  However, a
look across the United States currently reveals a patchwork of state
statutory and common law addressing enforcement power.  Some ju-
risdictions explicitly permit a private beneficiary of a protection order
to prosecute a defendant for criminal contempt of that order.104  How-
ever, only one state has considered the issue since Robertson came
down, leaving an open question about the sustainability of these pri-
vate rights of action.  In other states, courts have indicated that pri-
vate, interested parties can prosecute crimes in general, in some
circumstances, but courts have not addressed the prosecution of crimi-
nal contempt cases by beneficiaries of court orders.105  In a significant
number of other jurisdictions, courts either explicitly prohibit the pri-
102. Id. at 273 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
103. The D.C. Court of Appeals strictly incorporated the dissent’s opinion into its own recon-
sideration of Robertson. See In re Robertson, 19 A.3d 751, 755–56 (D.C. 2011).
104. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT  § 846 (McKinney 2016); ALASKA R. CIVIL P. 90(b) (permit-
ting a private party to prosecute criminal contempt); Olmstead v. Olmstead, 284 S.W.3d 27,
28–29 (Ark. 2008) (upholding a private party’s right to prosecute, distinguishing this case from
Young); Gay v. Gay, 485 S.E.2d 187, 188 (Ga. 1997) (permitting a wife to prosecute her former
husband in a criminal contempt case); Marcisz v. Marcisz, 357 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ill. 1976) (hold-
ing that counsel may prosecute criminal contempt for the beneficiary’s order); Wilson v. Wilson,
984 S.W.2d 898, 903–04 (Tenn. 1998) (noting that due process does not require the disqualifica-
tion of a private party as prosecutor of a criminal contempt case); Ex parte Landry, 117 So. 3d
714, 717 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that an order of protection requiring the
defendant-father to notify the mother, her attorney, and the court if and when he obtained em-
ployment permitted her to independently pursue a motion for criminal contempt); Rollins v.
State ex rel. Municipality of Anchorage, 748 P.2d 767, 769, 771 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (uphold-
ing a criminal contempt prosecution by an interested party); Eichhorn v. Kelley, 111 P.3d 544,
548 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to adopt a rule that would prohibit a beneficiary of an order
from prosecuting for contempt); Long v. Hutchins, 926 So. 2d 556, 567 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (en
banc) (noting and approving of the procedure of private parties “traditionally and naturally”
prosecuting for criminal contempt); Katz v. Commonwealth, 399 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (Mass. 1979)
(holding, in a landlord-tenant case, that a private party in civil litigation may press both the civil
and criminal aspects of a case); DeGeorge v. Warheit, 741 N.W.2d 384, 392 (Mich. Ct. App.
2007) (permitting criminal contempt cases to be pursued by private parties); State ex rel. O’Brien
v. Moreland, 778 S.W.2d 400, 406–07 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding private prosecution for
criminal contempt).
105. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Gilchrist, 497 S.E.2d 412, 415–16 (N.C. 1998) (stating that North
Carolina permits private prosecutors to pursue crimes); State v. Ray, 143 N.E.2d 484, 485 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1967) (stating that private prosecutors representing interested parties can prosecute
crimes); State v. Crouch, 445 S.E.2d 213, 218–19 (W. Va. 1994) (holding that private prosecution
should be allowed to permit a victim’s family to assure itself that a case is vigorously pursued).
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vate prosecution of criminal contempt cases or generally preclude pri-
vate parties from prosecuting criminal cases.106
Looking to the court, the prosecution, and protected parties illus-
trates that the power and the will to enforce custody and parenting
time provisions of protection orders by criminal mechanisms rarely
coalesce.  Further, Robertson suggests that individuals whose protec-
tion orders are violated—those with the will—may have increasingly
limited recourse through the criminal justice system.  Because the
court often lacks the will, and may lack the power, to enforce these
provisions, in many jurisdictions, aggrieved parties who seek criminal
enforcement of protection orders are completely dependent on the
government’s exercise of discretion.
B. Civil Contempt and Its Remedies
Given the limitations on the power to enforce criminal contempt,
civil contempt is a frequent alternate course sought to fortify the relief
in a protection order.  The power and the will to enforce protection
orders overlap much more seamlessly in the civil contempt context.
However, the law surrounding civil contempt relief complicates the
effectiveness of a civil action in this context.  Those complications
threaten to render the power to enforce an order through civil con-
tempt meaningless for those who stand at the intersection of power
and will.  This Section briefly considers who has the power and will to
enforce custody and visitation provisions of protection orders through
106. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1108(e) (2015) (codifying that the state’s attorney
should  prosecute criminal contempt cases); Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 560 U.S.
272, 281 (2010) (per curiam) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that private prosecution of crimi-
nal contempt cases should be prohibited); People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d. 310, 315 (Cal. 1996)
(citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100(d) (West 2013)) (holding that all criminal prosecutions must be
prosecuted in the name of the people of California and by their authority); DiSabatino v.
Salicete, 671 A.2d 1344, 1353 (Del. 1996) (following Young and holding that an attorney for the
beneficiary of an order in a civil proceeding may not represent the party in a subsequent criminal
contempt prosecution); Rogers v. State, 348 S.E.2d 888, 889 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
private parties are prohibited from acting as private prosecutors in criminal cases); Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. ex rel. Montero v. Montero, 758 P.2d 690, 693 (Haw. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that, inter-
ested, private prosecutors may not prosecute criminal contempt actions); State ex rel. LaMere v.
Young, 192 N.W.2d 186, 187 (Minn. 1971) (per curiam) (holding that a petitioner’s attorney may
not act as a special prosecutor in a contempt action); State v. Warford, 389 N.W.2d 575, 582
(Neb. 1986) (stating that private prosecutors are not permitted); Rogowicz v. O’Connell, 786
A.2d 841, 844 (N.H. 2001) (holding that interested parties may not prosecute criminal contempt
cases); State v. Valentine, 864 A.2d 433, 435–36 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (setting certifi-
cation requirements for private prosecutors that disqualify interested parties from prosecuting
criminal contempt); In re Mowery, 169 P.2d 835, 842–43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that
Washington State law requires disinterested prosecutors); Trecost v. Trecost, 502 S.E.2d 445, 449
(W. Va. 1988) (holding that it is unconstitutional for a private, interested party to prosecute a
criminal contempt case).
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civil contempt and then interrogates the underlying law applicable to
the relief offered through this cause of action.107
1. Judicial and Prosecutorial Power and Will
Pursuant to its inherent authority to enforce orders108 and to statu-
tory authority in some jurisdictions,109 the court can initiate and pun-
ish violations of court orders through civil contempt.  The court also
often possesses the will to initiate civil contempt.  Civil contempt
cases, without the due process procedures accorded to criminal con-
tempt matters, are far less burdensome on the court’s docket.110  A
coercive order to comply with the court’s directive can be an easy fix
to a noncompliance problem.111  The prosecution, on the other hand,
has no power to enforce the provisions of a court order through civil
contempt.  Civil contempt is a companion to an action in equity and,
by nature, a civil case.112  As such, the state has no right of action.
2. The Protected Party’s Power, Will, and Limitations
Private parties hold the power to seek enforcement of the custody
and parenting provisions of protection orders through civil contempt.
With a relatively low burden of proof and no constitutional right to
counsel for the defendant, civil contempt cases can be filed by private
107. Most appellate case law dealing with the enforcement of custody and visitation orders
address long-term orders entered in the domestic relations context.  Largely due to the dearth of
counsel and available remedies, appellate case law does not include civil contempt cases related
to the enforcement of custody and visitation provisions within a protection order.  As such, this
Article analyzes the enforcement of domestic relations orders through civil contempt as a close
analogy because the same rationale would apply to considering enforcement.
108. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text (discussing how the court’s power to initi- R
ate criminal contempt cases has been critical to the administration of justice).
109. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-864 (2003) (permitting the court to imprison a
defendant for his failure to obey a court order to compel compliance); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
15-1102 (2008) (codifying the court’s “full power” to enforce any order by contempt).
110. Livingston, supra note 23, at 353–54 (“Unlike civil contempt, [criminal contempt] re- R
quires full-blown criminal procedures, including the privilege against self-incrimination, right to
counsel, the presumption of innocence, proof of the violation beyond a reasonable doubt, and
the right to a jury trial for serious sanctions.” (footnotes omitted)).
111. See In re Keane, 110 B.R. 477, 482 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that civil contempt is
more appropriate than criminal contempt because the court seeks an efficient resolution of the
matter); Hopp v. Hopp, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Minn. 1968) (noting the importance of efficiency
in civil contempt cases); Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy
Toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 617,
651–52 (“Some jurisdictions, such as Marion County, Indiana, find civil enforcement more effi-
cient than criminal enforcement.”).
112. Livingston, supra note 23, at 353 (noting that a coercive contempt case is an adjunct to an R
action in equity).
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attorneys or even pro se litigants without overwhelming procedural
barriers.113
Legal barriers, however, can leave civil contempt of questionable
assistance to a party who wishes to deter continuing violations and
wishes to be compensated for breached parenting time or custody or-
ders.  Remedies at common law for civil contempt vary significantly
across jurisdictions, revealing a patchwork of case law.  With little stat-
utory guidance, courts have taken a variety of approaches that limit
the effectiveness of the relief available to litigants pursuing civil con-
tempt in this context.
a. Limitations on Coercive Remedies
Federal and state courts in a wide array of jurisdictions have held
that the purpose of civil contempt is to enforce both compliance with
a court order and compensate for losses related to the noncompli-
ance.114  However, in some jurisdictions, if the contemnor has come
into compliance by the time of the hearing, then the court will not
impose further remedies to compensate the complainant.115  For ex-
ample, in Bruzzi v. Bruzzi,116 a father was subject to civil contempt
when he failed to return the children after visitation.117  The court
held that because the children had been returned by the time of the
hearing, the court was not empowered to impose any civil contempt
remedies, noting that the father “could not be coerced into returning
the children; he had already done so.”118  Similarly, in Watford-Cun-
113. Id. at 353–54.
114. See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 829 (1994); Hicks ex
rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 635 (1988) (noting that sanctions can be purely remedial); In
re Babbidge, 175 B.R. 708, 717 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); see also, e.g., Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 531 F.2d 617, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“Judicial sanctions in a
civil contempt proceeding are proper either to coerce compliance with the court’s order for the
complainant’s benefit, or to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.”); Fuller v. Fuller,
987 A.2d 1040, 1045–46 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010); Loewinger v. Stokes, 977 A.2d 901, 915–16 (D.C.
2009) (“[C]ivil contempt is a sanction that is ‘designed to . . . compensate the aggrieved party for
any loss or damage sustained as a result of the contemnor’s noncompliance.’” (quoting D.D. v.
M.T., 550 A.2d 37, 43–44 (D.C. 1988))); In re T.S., 829 A.2d 937, 940 (D.C. 2003) (“[C]ivil con-
tempt serves one of two purposes . . . . ”).
115. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Reynolds, 557 S.E.2d 126, 131 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (“A trial court
. . . does not have the authority to impose civil contempt after an individual has complied with a
court order, even if the compliance occurs after the party is served with a motion to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt of court.”), rev’d, 569 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. 2002); c.f. Fields v.
Fields, 240 S.E.2d 58, 60 (Ga. 1977) (stating that in visitation cases, civil contempt may be an
inadequate means of enforcement and that criminal contempt might be the more appropriate
action to achieve vindication of the court’s authority).
116. 481 A.2d 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
117. Id. at 650.
118. Id. at 652.
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ningham discussed supra, for example, the court refused to compen-
sate the mother for the father’s failure to produce the children for
visitation.119  The mother sought compensatory visitation time for the
months of missed visitation.  Instead, the court ruled: “The purpose of
Civil Contempt . . . is not to punish for past behavior. It’s to compel
current behavior.”120  The court refused to provide compensation of
the many hours of visitation of which the mother had been deprived.
If an aggrieved party seeks compliance in the form of a one-time
payment or the performance of a particular action, coercion into com-
pliance itself may be sufficient to compensate a protected party for
her losses.121  In a child support case, for example, although the con-
temnor has violated a court order in the past, coercion into payment
of arrears usually makes the other party whole.  As such, the goals of
civil contempt have been reified.  But, in the context of an ongoing
breach of a custody or visitation order, a nonmonetary obligation, co-
ercion into compliance only forces the contemnor to come into con-
temporaneous compliance not to fulfill past obligations.  This coercion
cannot compensate past breaches that have hurt the protected party.
Without assurance that the court will compensate the aggrieved party,
civil contempt remedies can be of questionable utility to a party who
has been repeatedly denied her court-ordered custody and visitation
rights.  Moreover, civil contempt remedies that are limited to coercion
have minimal deterrence value.  When a contemnor realizes that he
must merely come into compliance upon service of a motion, he has
little incentive to remain in compliance in the future.
b. Limitations on Compensatory Sanctions
Coercive sanctions are more frequently granted than remedial relief
in civil contempt actions.122  However, even when judges do award
remedial sanctions in civil contempt cases, those sanctions are often
monetary.123  For example, the court might impose a monetary rem-
119. See supra notes 34–66 and accompanying text. R
120. December Transcript, supra note 51, at 17–18.
121. See Mahoney, supra note 71, at 868 (discussing the shortcomings of traditional civil con- R
tempt remedies when dealing with a recurring violation that cannot be fully addressed by merely
coercing one-time compliance).
122. Id. at 866.
123. See, e.g., MacIntosh v. MacIntosh, 749 N.E.2d 626, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Meade v.
Levett, 671 N.E.2d 1172, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); see also Mahoney, supra note 71, at 873; R
Doug Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt: Plaintiff’s Remedy When a Defendant Violates an
Injunction, 1980 U. ILL. L. FORUM 971, 971.  Several state statutes explicitly authorize the
court to award compensatory monetary remedies in civil contempt cases related to custody
enforcement. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 452.400(6)(3) (2000); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 26.09.160(2)(b)(ii)–(iii) (2014).
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edy to compensate a litigant for the litigation costs or out-of-pocket
expenses.124  Or the court might award monetary damages to compen-
sate for inconvenience or frustration resulting from the breach in the
long-term custody context.125
Monetary remedies126 are insufficient on several levels to compen-
sate an aggrieved party in cases of breached custody provisions of pro-
tection orders.127  First, although they might have a deterrent effect
for some contemnors, monetary damages are ineffective in cases in
which the contemnor determines that the violation is worth the pen-
alty.128  For example, a father might determine that risking a fine to
compensate the mother for her time and gas coming to his house to
pick up the children when he refuses to surrender them after visitation
is worth the benefit of keeping the children in contravention of the
order.  Monetary damages also have limited deterrent effect on a de-
fendant who cannot pay the award.  A defendant without resources to
meet the monetary obligation cannot be coerced into paying with the
124. See, e.g., Zillmer v. Lakins, 544 N.E.2d 550, 552–53 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that it
was a proper use of a civil contempt sanction to order reimbursement of costs for locating and
obtaining physical custody of children that the contemnor was withholding from the other
parent).
125. See, e.g., Meade, 671 N.E.2d at 1181–82 (holding that there was sufficient evidence to
grant monetary damages to compensate the complaining party for inconvenience and
frustration).
126. Courts are split on the availability of monetary remedies.  When an aggrieved party can-
not quantify her losses, courts in some jurisdictions refuse to grant monetary relief, considering it
an impermissible punitive fine. See, e.g., MacIntosh, 749 N.E.2d at 631; Levis v. Markee, 771
S.W.2d 928, 932 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (“Generally, an outright fine, unrelated to actual damages,
is not appropriate for civil contempt because it is not designed to cure but is intended to pun-
ish.”); Nelson v. Nelson, 598 N.Y.S.2d 609, 612 (App. Div. 1993) (finding that a monetary fine
for the respondent’s failure to deliver the children to two scheduled visitation dates would be
unduly harsh).  In other jurisdictions, courts have affirmed monetary awards for nonmonetary
losses in civil contempt cases in the custody context. See, e.g., Meade, 671 N.E.2d at 1181 (stating
that the court can consider compensating inconvenience and frustration with monetary relief);
Luminella v. Marcocci, 814 A.2d 711, 719 (Pa. 2002) (affirming a $500 fine imposed on a mother
for breaching the custody order).  For example, a Florida court imposed a $100 per day fine on a
mother to compensate the father for the mother’s failure to return the child to his custody for
sixty-one days.  Laroche v. Briggs, 720 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).  In another
case, the Florida court noted that compensatory damages for unliquidated injuries are generally
unavailable in noncommercial matters.  Habie v. Habie, 654 So. 2d 1293, 1295 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).  But, the court held that it should have discretion to award compensatory monetary
awards if the court has a “reasonable basis for concluding that a compensable injury may have
been suffered as a result of a willful violation of an . . . order.” Id.  Because these cases are hard
to find and are sprinkled across a few different jurisdictions, they cannot provide certainty for a
party seeking to rely on a custody order.
127. Mahoney, supra note 71, at 872 (noting that remedies scholars have generally addressed R
the difficulty of awarding monetary relief for the breach of an equitable coercive court order).
128. The calculus is equally valid in the context of family law and other civil injunctions.  See
Wainstein, supra note 66, at 735, for an example in the context of trademark infringement. R
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threat of jail time.129  As such, the relief will neither deter the contem-
nor from future noncompliance nor compensate the aggrieved party.
Second, although a monetary remedy, which is granted to compen-
sate a party for the aggravation of having to bring a suit to realize
one’s rights, might provide some relief to a parent after the breach of
a custody provision of a protection order,130 it rarely addresses the
actual loss.  Money cannot compensate a parent for a long-term loss of
access to her children.  Further, it cannot compensate for a unilateral
decision to change a child’s school or religion.  Consider Mrs. Cun-
ningham: How would one quantify the monetary value of six months
of visitation with her children?  Even if the court did award her money
to compensate for this loss, how could it address the actual loss she
sustained?
In these cases, compensation in the form of make-up visitation,
physical custody, a mandate to reverse the unilateral parenting deci-
sion, or to engage in mediation to reconsider the decision would far
more effectively compensate the aggrieved party.131  This remedial ac-
tion would equitably redistribute the “good” to compensate for the
breach.
In some jurisdictions, courts will award make-up parenting time in a
civil contempt case to compensate a party whom has been denied ac-
cess to her child.  Those awards, however, usually rely on explicit stat-
utory authorization132 or on a court order that sets forth specific
penalties for breach.  For example, a Texas statute permits the imposi-
129. State ex rel. Foster v. McKenzie, 683 S.W.2d 270, 270 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that to
justify imprisonment for contempt, the defendant must be able to purge himself of the con-
tempt); Reeves v. Crownshield, 8 N.E.2d 283, 284 (N.Y. 1937) (“[The Court’s] manifest intent is
to exempt from imprisonment the honest debtor who is poor, and in good faith unable to pay his
debts.”); Hodges v. Hodges, 307 S.E.2d 575, 577 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that states, like
North Carolina, require that the defendant being held in contempt be able to comply with the
order, and. if the defendant is unable to comply, then the court cannot imprison the defendant).
130. See, e.g., MacIntosh, 749 N.E.2d at 628–29, 631 (awarding compensatory payment for the
monetary loss related to one parent not producing the children for a scheduled trip with the
other parent).
131. See LaLoggia-VonHegel v. VonHegel, 732 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(“[A]n award of make-up or additional visitation may serve both to redress the wrong to the
parent and to effectuate compliance with the court’s authority.”).
132. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13(4)(c)(1) (2014) (setting forth authority to award make-up
visitation to a parent who was denied visitation); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.642(1) (2015) (di-
recting that all circuits shall establish a make-up parenting time policy for cases when a parent
has wrongfully been denied parenting time); In re Marriage of Herrera, 772 P.2d 676, 680 (Colo.
App. 1989) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129.5(2)(g) (2014)) (affirming a lower court judg-
ment granting make-up visitation to a father who was denied his visitation time under a court
order in a state with  a statute that explicitly authorized make-up visitation as a remedy for
parenting time interference).
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tion of make-up time to compensate a parent for lost visitation.133
The court of appeals then enforced that statutory provision and, in
fact, held that awarding only seven days of make-up visitation time to
compensate for ninety-seven days of denied visitation was unfair.  The
court directed the lower court to reconsider and award more time.134
In a Florida case, the appeals court affirmed that a court may enforce
a court order that specified that a party who has been denied visita-
tion can be compensated with additional child access hours.135  Limits
on compensatory relief as to its availability and form often render civil
contempt an unresponsive remedy for parents seeking to enforce the
violation of parenting provisions in a protection order.
c. Purge Clauses Further Limit Effectiveness
Purge clauses may foreclose relief that is appropriate to redress past
recurrent violations. Imposing a condition that the defendant may sat-
isfy to purge the contempt, purge clauses are included in the typical
civil contempt sentence.136  In civil contempt, jail time can be imposed
only if the contemnor has the ability to come into compliance and,
even then, only until he has complied with the breached order.137
Purge clauses are an excellent way to coerce one-time payments or a
one-time surrender of medical records or school reports.  However, a
133. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.168(a) (West 2014).
134. Romero v. Zapien, No. 13-07-00758-CV, 2010 WL 2543897, at *17 (Tex. App. Ct. June
24, 2010) (mem.), abrogated by Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011).
135. Lombard v. Lombard, 997 So. 2d 1188, 1190–91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); c.f. Rush v.
Rush, No. 74832, 1999 WL 1044482, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1999) (noting that in a prior
case, the court had found the mother in contempt for interfering with the father’s visitation
rights, sentenced her to thirty days in jail but allowed her to purge by permitting the father to
make-up for lost visitation).
136. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 494 So. 2d 664, 667 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (affirming a civil
contempt sentence against a mother that suspended her jail time and allowed the mother to
purge the contempt by coming into compliance with the divorce decree); De Mauro v. State, 632
So. 2d 727, 729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the order for civil contempt specified that
the contemnor could purge her contempt by returning the children to the other parent); MacIn-
tosh, 749 N.E.2d 626, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (invalidating a fine imposed in a civil contempt
sentence because it was imposed without any opportunity to purge); Bryant v. Howard Cty.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Costley, 874 A.2d 457, 466 (Md. 2005) (“[I]f [a contempt penalty] is to
be coercive rather than punitive, [it] must provide for purging; it must permit the [contemnor] to
avoid the penalty by some specific conduct that is within the [contemnor’s] ability to perform.”)
137. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 3136(5) (2014) (noting that individuals can be imprisoned
and held in contempt if they are able to comply with the order, but first, they must be given the
opportunity to purge themselves of the order; and, once they purge themselves, they are to be
released); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22.110(1) (2013) (noting that for the court to award jail time,
the court must first determine that the defendant can comply with the order; the defendant may
only remain imprisoned until the defendant does comply); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.06
(LexisNexis 2000) (“When the contempt consists of the omission to do an act which the accused
yet can perform, he may be imprisoned until he performs it.”).
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purge remedy may not be responsive to an aggrieved parent’s need for
future compliance or past compensation, leading courts to query
whether civil contempt can be a proper remedy for the violation of a
custody or visitation order.138
In Boggs v. Boggs,139 for example, the court distinguished between
civil and criminal contempt by holding that, ordinarily, civil contempt
findings must allow for the contemnor to purge the violation.140  The
court reasoned that without an opportunity to purge, the contemnor
would be properly subject to criminal contempt remedies.141  The
court held the father in contempt for his failure to pay child and
spousal support, and the court further provided that his jail sentence
would be suspended on the condition of consistent payment.142  The
court also held the father in contempt for having exposed the children
to his “paramour” in contravention of the custody order.  For that vio-
lation, the trial court sentenced the father to serve the remaining ten
days of his sentence in jail because that violation could not be dis-
charged by performance.143  On appeal, the court held that the jail
sentence was impermissibly punitive for a civil contempt case because
there was no opportunity to purge the violation.144
In the end, although will and power coalesce in the party protected
by a court order, an aggrieved party may find that the civil system—
the only system that she may be able to access—offers ineffective re-
lief.  The civil contempt remedy alone is likely to be less successful
than criminal contempt in assuring future compliance.  It fails to con-
vey the importance of compliance with an order of the court.145  Fur-
138. See Wilson v. Freeman, 402 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (citing 24 AM. JUR.
2D Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Nonsuit to Divorce and Separation § 811 (1936)) (suggesting
that there is a serious question whether civil contempt is an appropriate response to  noncompli-
ance with a visitation order); De Mauro, 632 So. 2d at 730 (noting that an appropriate sanction
for concealing the children for three months from the other parent would most likely have come
from a criminal rather than a civil contempt action).
139. 2 N.E.2d 674 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
140. Id. at 678 (citing Brown v. Exec. 200, Inc., 416 N.E.2d 610, 613 (Ohio 1980)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Jeffrey A. Parness & Daniel J. Sennott, Expanded Recognition in Written Laws of Ancil-
lary Federal Court Powers: Supplementing the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 64 U. PITT. L.
REV. 303, 322 (2003) (“The chief purpose of coercive civil contempt is to resolve issues in an
individual case, not to aid the court as an institution.”).  A Florida appellate court considered
this issue when reasoning that a civil contempt remedy may send the message that a contemnor
is exempt from punishment for on-going noncompliance with a court order.  The court stated
that “the trial court should have initiated a proceeding for indirect criminal contempt” to punish
the contemnor for her “substantial infraction.”  De Mauro v. State, 632 So. 2d 727, 730 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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ther, the civil contempt system, with its complex web of legal barriers
to compensatory relief, can offer a limited enforcement remedy for
nonmonetary losses and for recurrent violations, leaving a protected
party and a contemnor to reasonably conclude that the custody and
visitation provisions of a protection order are of nominal value.
C. What Is Distinctive about the Enforceability
of These Provisions?
Why should we be concerned with the barriers to enforcement of
domestic relations provisions in protection orders? Aren’t all civil or-
ders challenged by the practice and law surrounding criminal and civil
contempt?  Indeed they are.  Court orders granting relief in a wide
range of civil cases, such as contract disputes,146 patent infringe-
ment,147 and bankruptcy,148 are flouted by defendants, and the same
principles of criminal and civil contempt equally apply to these orders.
Enforcement of these orders should also be considered so that court
orders maintain their integrity so that protected parties can rely on
court-granted relief.  Indeed, many of the initiatives discussed in Part
IV can and should be broadly applied to the enforcement of all civil
orders.
However, this Article focuses on this specific enforcement challenge
because the power to enforce these provisions criminally resides with
those who do not often deploy that power and because both civil and
criminal enforcement mechanisms are distinctively unresponsive to
the problems underlying the violation.  The enforcement of custody
and visitation provisions differs in relevant ways from the enforce-
146. See, e.g., DeGeorge v. Warheit, 741 N.W.2d 384, 386–87 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (per
curiam) (concerning a criminal contempt matter enforcing a court order that arose from a con-
tract dispute); Cemetery Comm’r v. Burcham, No. 201437, 1998 WL 1988776, at *1, *3 (Mich. Ct.
App. Nov. 17, 1998) (holding a defendant in criminal contempt for intentionally violating a per-
manent injunction from entering into contracts for the sale or assignment of burial rights, en-
tombment rights, columbarium rights, cemetery merchandise, or cemetery services); Busch v.
Berg, 384 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302–03 (App. Div. 1976) (mem.) (holding a vendor in contempt for
failing to perform on a real estate contract).
147. See, e.g., H. J. Heinz Co. v. Superior Court, 266 P.2d 5, 7, 10 (Cal. 1954) (affirming the
trial court’s decision to hold the defendant in civil contempt for violation of an injunction re-
straining defendant from building or using vinegar generators that infringed on a patent); Step
Saver, Inc. v. Glacier Salt, Inc., No. A04-1805, 2005 WL 1389581, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. June 14,
2005) (affirming the trial court’s decision to hold appellants in civil contempt of court for failing
to obey the district court’s prior orders to cease salt delivery in violation of the patent).
148. See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Rogers, 314 N.E.2d 679, 680, 682 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)
(affirming the trial court’s decision to sentence a judgment-debtor to county jail for contempt of
court for willfully refusing to pay a monthly installment on a money judgment, which was con-
trary to provisions of an order entered by the court in a previous proceeding despite a subse-
quent bankruptcy filing).
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ment of other civil and family law injunctions, making this issue par-
ticularly worthy of consideration.
1. Criminal Penalties
In the context of two parents seeking to care for their children,
criminal enforcement of a parenting provision may not be an appro-
priate remedy regardless of the state’s interest in pursuing the case.
Consider again the case of Mrs. Cunningham.  The parties agreed to
joint physical and legal custody of their children and together were
responsible for providing for their children.  Had the state agreed to
prosecute Mr. Cunningham for his numerous violations of the protec-
tion order’s visitation provisions, he would have faced a criminal con-
viction, which could have included either a fine or jail time.  The
collateral consequences of this type of conviction149 may well have in-
terfered dramatically with the best interests of the children.  A convic-
tion—part of his permanent record—could have hampered Mr.
Cunningham’s ability to seek employment, provide for the children,
and maintain a positive relationship with his children.150  Although
Mrs. Cunningham sought make-up visitation, she was unable to care
for the children overnight because she remained in a shelter.  Where
would the children have gone while Mr. Cunningham served his jail
sentence?  What effect would this turbulence have had on the chil-
dren?  And a fine—that would not be payable to Mrs. Cunningham
but to the state—would merely have burdened the family’s already
tight finances.  Although a criminal prosecution and a jail sentence
might have effectively deterred Mr. Cunningham from future viola-
tions, the children’s interests may well have been detrimentally
impacted.
149. See Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45
B.C. L. REV. 255, 272–76 (2004) (providing an overview of the myriad collateral consequences of
incarceration).
150. Sarah Abramowicz, Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 793, 812–13
(2011) (“Where the parent was a source of income for the child, incarceration will result in a
lower standard of living, and often leads to significant economic deprivation.”); Laurie S. Kohn,
Money Can’t Buy You Love: Valuing Contributions by Nonresidential Fathers, 81 BROOK. L.
REV. 53, 77, 104–05 (discussing the various negative effects of incarceration on fathers); see
Tamar Lerer, Sentencing the Family: Recognizing the Needs of Dependent Children in the Admin-
istration of the Criminal Justice System, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 24, 32, 34 (2013) (“Parental
incarceration also increases the economic burden on these children and their remaining caretak-
ers . . . .  Further, the inability of a released inmate to find a place to live and gainful employment
results in the inmate having little access to legitimate work . . . . ”); Michael Pinard, Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 457, 492 (2010) (“[A]n individual with a criminal conviction will no longer be eligible for
numerous categories of employment.”).
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In a contempt case involving the care of children and a defendant-
parent who has parenting obligations, the best interests of the chil-
dren, although not an explicit consideration in a criminal prosecution,
should be addressed.  This consideration, which is so integral to the
violation in the first place, renders criminal contempt and prosecution
of the misdemeanor violation of a protection order far more complex
than a criminal contempt prosecution for the violation of another type
of court order.
Further, incarcerating a father for seeking out additional parenting
time may not be the message a court system, which already fails to
encourage fathers to engage in the lives of their children, should send
to parents.151  Although breaches of court orders should be addressed
promptly by courts, incarceration of fathers in this context risks per-
petuating barriers to father engagement and other disadvantages that
low-income children face.
When the defendant in a contempt action is the primary custodial
parent, incarceration is similarly problematic.  Because of the pre-
sumption against granting joint custody when there has been domestic
violence,152 and because of the relevance of that violence to the cus-
tody analysis,153 a substantial majority of parents awarded primary
custody in a protection order will be the protected parties.  However,
in some jurisdictions, courts have permitted contempt cases to pro-
ceed against the protected parties.154  Punishing a parent with primary
residential custody with jail time is likely to be particularly detrimen-
tal to the children involved—at least by upsetting their routine if not
inducing more severe psychological stress.
Finally, a criminal contempt action may not achieve a goal that is
consistent with the wishes of the aggrieved party.  Although punish-
ment may achieve future compliance, parents who have been denied
parental rights or parenting time often wish to have that loss recog-
151. Laurie S. Kohn, Engaging Men as Fathers: The Courts, the Law, and Father-Absence in
Low-Income Families, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 521–31 (2013) (discussing the barriers to father
engagement and the law’s role in perpetuating those obstacles).
152. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. R
153. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 13, § 705A(a) (2009) (establishing a presumption against
granting custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.230(1)
(2013) (establishing a presumption against granting sole custody to a parent who has committed
domestic violence.).
154. See, e.g., Reinhardt v. Strain, CIV. A. No. 07-3126, 2008 WL 4808897, at *4 (E.D. La.
Oct. 31, 2008) (analyzing if officers were justified in arresting a party for violating an order
issued to protect her); Francis X. Clines, Judge’s Domestic Violence Ruling Creates an Outcry in
Kentucky, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2002, at A14  (“[These] are orders of the court . . . .  People are
ordered to follow them, and I don’t care which side you’re on.” (quoting Judge Megan Lake
Thornton)).
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nized, redressed, remedied, and compensated.  In this way, prosecu-
tion for criminal contempt or a misdemeanor may represent an overly
criminalized155 enforcement response in cases involving co-parenting
but, at the same time, one that could be more appropriate and effec-
tive in the context of business injunction enforcement.
2. Civil Remedies Are More Responsive in Other Contexts
Civil contempt remedies are well calibrated to enforce civil orders
dictating one-time performances, such as surrendering property, ceas-
ing to infringe a patent or trademark, or paying off a debt or monetary
obligation.  As discussed supra, a contempt action can coerce per-
formance by imposing a jail sentence but providing a purge clause to
satisfy compliance.156  If the performance is merely a solitary obliga-
tion that the defendant can fulfill, then this relief can be responsive
and effective.  The obligation has been extinguished and the aggrieved
party has been made whole.
However, because of the limitations on relief discussed supra, with-
out further statutory guidance, ordinary civil contempt remedies that
are awarded are often insufficient either to coerce long-term compli-
ance of a custody and visitation provision of a protection order or to
compensate for recurrent breaches.157  Therefore, custody and visita-
tion provisions within protection orders present a particularly com-
plex enforcement challenge from the perspective of relief.
3. Dearth of Statutory Guidance
The enforcement of civil protection orders is governed by thin stat-
utory guidance around the country and by equitable principles of civil
and criminal contempt doctrines.  With protection orders statutes that,
at most, merely note the availability of civil contempt as an enforce-
ment action, judges are provided no specific direction about the range
of relief.158
155. See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 714, 716
(2005) (discussing the phenomenon of overcriminalization and arguing that the “criminal sanc-
tion should be reserved for specific behaviors and mental states that are so wrongful and harmful
to their direct victims or of the general public as to justify the official condemnation and denial
of freedom that flow from a guilty verdict”).
156. Supra notes 135–43 and accompanying text. R
157. See infra note 155 and accompanying text. R
158. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15(i) (2015) (noting that civil contempt is only an en-
forcement mechanism in the protection order statute); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-106(5)(a)
(LexisNexis 2012) (noting that civil contempt is only an enforcement mechanism in the protec-
tion order statute).
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In contrast, enforcement of other civil orders is governed by specific
statutes that elucidate the potential punitive, coercive, and compensa-
tory relief available.159  For example, in some jurisdictions, legislatures
have enacted domestic relations statutes that specify various forms of
relief available if a custody or visitation order is violated.160  Similarly,
the courts have developed rules providing for contempt remedies in
bankruptcy and property actions.161
Although these statutes do not provide reliable remedies for all ag-
grieved parties, they do give plaintiffs and defendants notice of the
range of enforcement remedies likely to be considered.  They also give
the judge specific statutory authority to provide compensatory relief
in civil cases, which may well be the most useful remedy for recurrent
violations.  The absence of statutes regulating enforcement of custody
and visitation provisions of protection orders further highlights the
complexity of this enforcement action and the necessity of reform in
this area.
4. Underrepresentation
The population of litigants seeking enforcement of protection or-
ders is more likely to be unrepresented than those litigants seeking to
enforce other civil injunctions.  The vast majority of petitioners in pro-
tection order cases appear pro se.162  Enforcement actions in trade-
mark and contract cases, by contrast, are likely to be handled by
experienced counsel who are in the position to negotiate with oppos-
ing counsel and advocate with the judge to secure an effective out-
159. See infra notes 204–14 and accompanying text (providing examples of statutes that pro-
vide broad remedies for violating a protection order).
160. In the jurisdictions that have enacted these statutes, relief may be available to enforce
the custody and parenting time provisions of a protection order as well.
161. See, e.g., Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020 (noting that the power of the bankruptcy judge to issue
sanctions for contempt is not limited to monetary punishment but includes the power to disci-
pline counsel and the power to imprison the bankrupt individual for failure to comply with an
order); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.570 (2015) (providing recovery for property by holding the disobedient
party in contempt and ordering a writ of sequestration).
162. See Beverly Balos, Domestic Violence Matters: The Case for Appointed Counsel in Pro-
tective Order Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 557, 567 (2006) (reporting that in
one Illinois jurisdiction, “neither party was represented in 83.4% of” protection cases); LEGAL
SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET
CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 26 (2009), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/
files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf (reporting that 98% of both
petitioners and respondents in domestic violence matters in Washington, D.C. are pro se); STATE
OF N.H. JUDICIAL BRANCH, CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE: A REPORT ON SELF- REPRESENTED LITI-
GANTS IN NEW HAMPSHIRE COURTS 2 (2004), http://www.nh.gov/judiciary/supreme/prosere-
port.pdf (reporting that in the New Hampshire domestic violence court, 97% of the cases involve
one party appearing pro se).
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come.163  They can, for example, seek to settle the case in a way that
makes the plaintiff whole.  Or they can argue to the judge that she
should appoint a private prosecutor or liberally construe her authority
to grant a wide-range of relief in a civil contempt case.  Pro se litigants
in protection order enforcement actions are unlikely to be prepared to
marshal these arguments or effectively negotiate a matter with the de-
fendant or opposing counsel.  They are unable to exert influence on
the prosecutor’s office to pursue a criminal enforcement action.  This
disparity in both access to legal representation and the capital that
attends legal representation render enforcement in the protection or-
der context an access to justice issue—one particularly in need of at-
tention and reform.
5. Law Enforcement and Judicial Reluctance
Historically, law enforcement and the judiciary have been reluctant
to interfere in family matters.164  The doctrine of family privacy has
often trumped state intervention.165  This reluctance is particularly no-
ticeable in the history of the state’s response to domestic violence.166
Whether out of respect for family privacy or based on distaste for be-
coming involved in the complexity and emotions of family dynam-
163. See Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P.2d 619, 626 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1954) (discussing the
duty of a lawyer to possess a requisite level of knowledge in the practice of income tax); Russell
M. Coombs, Noncourt-Connected Mediation and Counseling in Child-Custody Disputes, 17 FAM.
L.Q. 469, 491 (1984) (“[A] more significant advantage of having a lawyer as mediator is his
knowledge of the law and the legal consequences of the various decisions made by a divorcing
couple.”).
164. Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles in Tort
Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REV. 945, 976 (2004) (noting judicial
reluctance to interfere in marital problems); Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse
and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 557 (1999) (referring to state
actors’ historic responses as “years of indifference to intimate abuse”).
165. Franklin E. Zimring, Legal Perspectives on Family Violence, 75 CAL. L. REV. 521, 523
(1987) (“The justification for applying the family privacy doctrine . . . is the reluctance of govern-
ment to intrude on the affairs of an ongoing family . . . . ”); Morgan Lee Woolley, Note, Marital
Rape: A Unique Blend of Domestic Violence and Non-Marital Rape Issues, 18 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L. J. 269, 275 (2007) (“The problem is that law enforcement and the courts often
withhold protection when it is most critically needed out of respect for family privacy.”).
166. Kimberly D. Bailey, It’s Complicated: Privacy and Domestic Violence, 49 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1777, 1781 (2012) (“Influenced by liberal theorists such as John Locke, state actors be-
lieved domestic violence was a matter that should be handled within the privacy of the home.”);
Elaine M. Chiu, That Guy’s a Batterer!: A Scarlet Letter Approach to Domestic Violence in the
Information Age, 44 FAM. L.Q. 255, 286 (2010) (“Family privacy, nonintervention and chauvinis-
tic entitlement effectively isolated domestic abuse from law enforcement for centuries.”).
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ics,167 police, prosecutors, and the judiciary have failed to respond to
family violence in a consistent and reliable manner.168
In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,169 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that there is no property interest in police enforcement of a re-
straining order, and this case provides a telling example of the state’s
response to family violence.170  When a mother, who was the subject
of a protection order directing the father to remain more than 100 feet
from her home and not to molest their children, called the police
when she believed that the father had taken the children from her
front yard, the police took no action.171  Approximately five hours
later, while the children were still missing, the mother made a report.
“The officer who took the report ‘made no reasonable effort to en-
force the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or locate the three
children.  Instead, he went to dinner.”172  This case ended tragically
and illustrates the enduring ambivalence of law enforcement toward
becoming involved in family matters.
Although mandatory intervention policies abound in law enforce-
ment and prosecution nationwide,173 that historic reluctance affects
the treatment of family law matters and leaves the enforcement of
family law provisions of protection orders a particularly overlooked
problem.  Because injunctions involving other civil matters fail to trig-
ger historic resistance to intervention, their enforcement carries with
it less baggage, making enforcement more likely and less complex.174
All injunctions suffer from underenforcement, and parties pro-
tected by injunctions should be able to rely on those orders.  How-
ever, the particular context of the injunction issued in a protection
order case governing custody and visitation involves legal, procedural,
and systemic complications that make enforcement particularly criti-
cal to address.
167. See, e.g., Buel, supra note 164, at 966–67 (discussing examples in which judges have dis- R
missed the importance and severity of family violence cases).
168. See Stoever, supra note 1, at 1035 (noting the exceptional treatment of domestic violence R
injunctions as compared to injunctions in other contexts (including trademark, copyright, and
trade secret) as a result of the family privacy doctrine that has prevented abuse survivors from
receiving adequate injunctive relief).
169. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
170. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
171. Id. at 751–53.
172. Id. at 754 (quoting Complaint & Jury Demand at 4, Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 2001
WL 35973820 (Jan. 23, 2001) (No. 00-D-1285), 2000 WL 35529077).
173. Bailey, supra note 166, at 1785 (discussing the prevalence of mandatory intervention poli- R
cies for domestic violence); Mills, supra note 164, at 563–68 (analyzing the mandatory interven- R
tion policies of the police and prosecution nationwide).
174. See Stoever, supra note 1, at 1035–36. R
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IV. REALIZING THE PROMISE OF CUSTODY
AND VISITATION PROVISIONS
Custody provisions in a civil protection order are vital for the stabil-
ity of children and the protected parties’ peace of mind.  Their inclu-
sion as relief in protection order statutes across the country signals
nationwide unanimity that the determination of custody and visitation
matters, even in a temporary order, and is relevant to the successful
resolution of domestic violence issues and the safety of all involved.
But those protections are meaningless if they are unenforceable.
The enforcement mechanisms in their current form—misdemeanor
prosecution and criminal and civil contempt—are unlikely to result in
reliable custody and visitation provisions in protection orders.  The
myriad complications involved in the power to enforce, the will to en-
force, the procedural and administrative shortcomings, and the limita-
tions of the law surrounding relief all stand in the way of effective
enforcement.  To deliver on the promise of these provisions, a range
of procedural, administrative, and legal mechanisms, as well as advo-
cacy efforts, must be developed to instill in judges, prosecutors, and
aggrieved parties the power and the will to enforce orders in appropri-
ate cases.  They must also be empowered and counseled to do so in a
way that upholds the integrity of the order, instills faith in the system,
and is responsive to the needs of the family.
A. The Court’s Power Reconsidered
Formally, judges have the mechanisms available to them for effec-
tive enforcement in this context.  However, a range of advocacy, regu-
latory, procedural, and administrative initiatives are necessary to
move judges toward deploying these mechanisms and doing so contex-
tually to appropriately enforce these provisions and vindicate the
court’s authority.  The judiciary’s swift and appropriate intervention
may be the most effective response to remedy the breach of an order.
It is often difficult to address a violation ex post facto due to the com-
plexity of family dynamics and the limitations on relief that can com-
pensate for long-term violations involving children.
1. Show Cause Orders
Courts should be explicitly directed through advocacy, statutes, or
regulations to issue show cause orders for protection order violations
consistent with the wishes of the protected party.  Although judges in
many jurisdictions utilize show cause orders in specific circumstances,
that process is rarely codified in statutes or rules.  As such, litigants do
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not know to ask for such an action, and judges do not necessarily take
the initiative to issue the orders in this context.
A show cause order is a useful tool because it allows the defendant
to appear in an expedited fashion and informally defend against the
alleged violation.  The action also permits the judge to encourage
compliance short of ordering it through a criminal or civil remedy.175
In essence, a judge can use a show cause order as a warning—and an
opportunity to convey the importance of the order—before the sanc-
tity of the order has been even more seriously compromised and
before an enduring violation that is more difficult to redress has
occurred.
2. Private Prosecutors
Courts should be truly empowered to appoint private prosecutors
under appropriate circumstances when the public prosecutor fails to
prosecute.  As discussed supra, the right of a judge to initiate a crimi-
nal contempt matter encompasses the right to appoint a private prose-
cutor in the face of a refusal by the public prosecutor to pursue the
matter.176  However, in Young, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
there is a right to a disinterested prosecutor,177 which greatly circum-
scribed the availability of private prosecutors to prosecute criminal
contempt cases.  Although the lawyer who represented the aggrieved
party in the original case that resulted in the breached order might
have a commitment to the injured party, a disinterested lawyer, by
definition, does not share that commitment.  Finding another lawyer
who will prosecute the case without compensation is a tall order.178
For judges to realize their power to appoint private prosecutors, ju-
risdictions must either endeavor to create a database of pro bono
prosecutors,179 or they must commit public funds.  Soliciting pro bono
175. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. R
176. See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text (discussing the judge’s power to appoint a R
private prosecutor if the prosecution declines to pursue the case).
177. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text (noting that in Young, the court held that R
there is a right to a disinterested prosecutor).
178. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing that the possible difficulty in R
obtaining a private prosecutor who is willing to prosecute the case).
179. C.f. Quintin Johnstone, Law and Policy Issues Concerning the Provision of Adequate
Legal Services for the Poor, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 571, 603–04 (2011) (suggesting that
lawyers should devote time to pro bono work, and individuals in need of pro bono services
should have access to them); Martha Neil, Following New York’s Lead, California Bar Officials
Plan To Require Pro Bono Work for Admission, ABA J. (Mar. 13, 2015, 3:55 PM), http://www
.abajournal.com/news/article/following_new_yorks_lead_california_bar_officials_plan_to_re
quire_pro_bono (“Officials at legal aid organizations say more help representing low-income
individuals who can’t afford lawyers is greatly needed.”); Media Release, Nearly Three-Fourths
of America’s Lawyers Do Pro Bono Work, According to ABA Study (Feb. 19, 2009) (on file with
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prosecutors might be successful because prosecution could be attrac-
tive to law firm attorneys or law school clinics.  One commentator
proposed that the aggrieved party put money in a trust to be paid out
to the private prosecutor on resolution of the contempt matter.180  Al-
though this approach might be feasible and effective in some con-
tempt cases, it would limit the availability of prosecutors for indigent
litigants who could not afford to fund the trust.  An administrative
initiative would provide substance to the court’s ability to appoint pri-
vate prosecutors and greatly enhance the chances that prosecution
would proceed in these cases.
3. Contextual Sentencing
Judges should be provided with guidance on sentencing given the
contextual considerations involved in these cases.  This guidance could
be statutory, regulatory, or merely informal.181  In many cases, a sus-
pended sentence that is executed only in the event of a further breach
could be the most effective and appropriate sentence in the context of
a family in which an incarcerated parent would greatly disrupt the cus-
todial arrangement or the parent-child relationship.182  In the alterna-
tive, probationary terms could be set that are consistent with the
needs of the family and are in the best interests of the child.  Proba-
tionary terms could include an order to attend parenting classes or
comply with the parenting order.  If incarceration were determined
necessary to induce compliance, judges could be directed to impose an
incarceration schedule consistent with the contemnor’s parenting obli-
gations and with his relationship with his children.  In the end, al-
author) (“Although lawyers donate more than 20 million hours each year, the poor still do not
have access to the legal help they need 80 percent of the time.” (quoting Mark I. Schickman,
Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service)).
180. Wainstein, supra note 66, at 747. R
181. States may seek to influence judicial sentencing through a variety of approaches, includ-
ing advisory or mandatory sentencing guidelines. See DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES—MARYLAND AND NATIONWIDE (2014), http://dls.state.md.us/data/polanasu
bare/polanasubare_coucrijusncivmat/Sentencing-Guidelines-Final-Unsigned.pdf (providing an
overview of state sentencing structures). Recommendations for sentencing considerations could
be made through one of the many sentencing commissions established by the state or through
judiciary committees that retain the authority to create guidelines in other states. See John J.
Cullerton et al., Criminal and Sentencing Law Review Commissions: Detached, Contemplative
Decision Making on Matters of Criminal Justice System Reform, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 777,
800 (2008) (noting that as of 2008, twenty-six states had created state sentencing commissions);
Joanna Shepherd, Blakely’s Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Crime,
58 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 541 (2007) (discussing that the state courts have retained authority to
implement sentencing guidelines).
182. See Kohn, supra note 150, passim (providing an overview of research on the effect of R
father-absence).
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though courts should take violations of custody and parenting
provisions seriously, judges must remain attentive to supporting posi-
tive father-child relationships.
Finally, judicial education is necessary to enable judges to be atten-
tive to the larger contextual issues related to the enforcement of these
provisions.  Advocates could seek out training opportunities with
judges to note special issues related to relief in civil contempt cases,
the importance of the enforcement of these orders despite their civil
domestic relations nature, and the availability of private prosecution.
4. Enhanced Opportunity To Appeal
There is very little appellate guidance for judges with regard to the
handling of contempt motions in this context.  This dearth of case law
relates to several factors, not the least relevant of which is the absence
of counsel in domestic violence cases.183  But, in addition to this fac-
tor, cases are not analyzed on appeal because judges often decline to
rule on motions for contempt in this arena.  Instead, they ask the par-
ties to work it out, they set further hearing dates, and they urge the
parties to address these issues in domestic relations cases.  Eventually
parties stop returning to court, or the plaintiffs dismiss the cases out of
frustration.  As such, there is no ruling to appeal.  Administrative or-
ders setting deadlines for judges to rule on motions for contempt in
domestic violence cases could mandate that judges rule on motions in
timely ways to permit effective enforcement or, in the alternative, to
permit appeal.184
B. Prosecutor Power Reconsidered
Although prosecutors hold the power to enforce custody and
parenting provisions of custody orders, they generally lack the will to
deploy that power.  Reforms that are achieved through advocacy, leg-
islation, and judicial education to make prosecution both more preva-
lent and more effective should focus on incentivizing enforcement and
assuring that enforcement and sentencing be undertaken in a contex-
tual way that is responsive to the needs of the family at issue.
183. See supra Part III (discussing how misdemeanor prosecution and criminal and civil con-
tempt are unlikely to result in reliable custody and visitation provisions in protection orders).
184. Appeals themselves are complex in this context because protection orders, which are
generally short term orders, often expire before the appeal is heard. See Stoever, supra note 1, R
at 1083–85 (discussing the varying lengths of protection orders).  If the order has expired, appel-
late courts often deem the appellate issues in the appeal to be moot. See Watford-Cunningham
v. Cunningham, 69 A.3d 404 (D.C. 2013) (affirming the dismissal of a civil contempt motion
based on mootness because the order had expired).
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1. Incentivizing Government Enforcement
Prosecutors, as discussed supra, ordinarily exercise their discretion
not to pursue criminal enforcement of the parenting relief in a protec-
tion order.  Advocacy centered on reinforcing the importance of
parenting provisions of protection orders and the consequences
nonenforcement could increase the likelihood that prosecutors pursue
enforcement of these provisions.  Further, more prevalent legislation
criminalizing interference with custody would render prosecution
more likely.
Encouraging prosecutors to perceive the infringement of the
parenting provisions of a protection order in a broader context could
induce more aggressive enforcement.  Advocates could raise
prosecutorial awareness about the potential consequences of the sys-
tem, turning a blind eye to overt and recurrent violations of protection
orders—even the parenting provisions.  A respondent who realizes
that he can violate the parenting provisions of a protection order may
well, and rationally in fact, determine that he can violate the order
without consequence.  Sanctioning violations of some relief under-
mines all relief—even the relief that is intended to directly protect the
safety of the victim, such as the stay away and no abuse provisions.
Drawing an explicit connection between breaches of parenting provi-
sions and general safety could incentivize prosecutors to respond
more aggressively.
Further, advocates could convey to prosecutors the connection be-
tween custodial tension and violence.  It is precisely this connection
that first induced jurisdictions to include protection orders as available
relief in family law.185  When parties—who already have a history of
violence and abuse—fight over children and are forced to negotiate
185. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the
Role of the Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 24–25 (1999)
(noting that “[a]lthough a civil protection order can resolve a survivor’s family-law problems
swiftly, it only provides temporary relief[,]” and it is important to reduce this temporary relief
gap by “fil[ing] for permanent relief, [like divorce and custody,]” while adjudicating the civil
protection order); Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Bat-
tered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 890 (1993)
(finding that it is important for a judge to consolidate a petitioner’s family law case and domestic
violence case because it “improves civil protection orders effectiveness”); Laurie S. Kohn,
What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? Restorative Justice as a New Paradigm
for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 517, 554–55 (2010) (noting that
“[p]rotection order statutes have expanded the scope of relief available to victims from simple
stay away orders to include family law[,]” and these statutes include other relief, such as family
law relief, to address the conflict between, and meet the needs of the parties).
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about parenting styles, the risk of violence increases.186  Swift enforce-
ment to reinforce the sanctity of the order is likely to reestablish a
custodial system that quells tensions and reduces the opportunity for
direct conflict.
Further, advocates could insist on framing a violation of the parent-
ing provisions of a protection order as about not “merely” a family
matter, but about criminal behavior.  At its essence, violating any pro-
vision of a protection order—be it a no abuse provision or a parenting
time provision—is a criminal act.  State statutes criminalizing the vio-
lation of a protection order do not distinguish between different types
of breaches.  Similarly, the knowing and willful violation of a protec-
tion order amounts to criminal contempt of a court order187 regardless
of what type of relief is contained in that injunction.  The breach of a
parenting time provision is a crime.
In the 1970s and 1980s, when advocates were seeking to induce the
criminal justice system to take seriously violence that occurs between
intimates, they made similar arguments.188  Regardless of the con-
duct’s intimate context, the action itself amounted to criminal behav-
ior and should be treated equivalently.  Advocates recognized that the
criminal justice system was resistant to entering into family disputes
and pursued this initiative by illustrating the essential criminal nature
of violence, even when it occurs in the home or between intimates.189
And, ultimately, their arguments were persuasive.190  All states and
186. See Elizabeth LaFlamme, Missouri’s Parenting Plan Requirement: Is It in the Best Interest
of Domestic Violence Victims?, 56 J. MO. B. 30, 32 (2000) (noting that joint parental decision
making increases contact between the abuser and the victim and enhances the risk of further
violence); c.f. Klein & Orloff, supra note 185, at 866 (finding that when a parent seeks joint R
custody or unsupervised visitation and there is evidence of past family violence, there must be an
investigation into the family violence, and state legislators and judges creating custody laws must
understand the propensity for continued violence).
187. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text (noting that to prevail in a criminal con- R
tempt action, the prosecutor must prove that the contemnor willfully violated the court order).
188. See Zimring, supra note 165, at 536 (noting that in the 1970s and 1980s, advocates per- R
ceived that “anything other than criminalization demeans the seriousness of the offenses and the
dignity of the victim-interests at stake in family violence”). See generally Laurie S. Kohn, The
Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 211–24 (2008) (discussing the evolution of mandatory intervention
policies and the criminalization of domestic violence).
189. See Domestic Violence, Not Just a Family Matter: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime
& Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong. 2d Sess. 54–55 (1994) (statement
of Joan Zorza, Senior Attorney, National Battered Women’s Law Project, National Center on
Women and Family Law); Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Arrest Experiments: A Feminist Critique,
83 J. CRIM. L.  & CRIMINOLOGY 201, 206 (1992).
190. See Bailey, supra note 166, at 1785 (“Feminist activists, therefore, were quite successful in R
changing the national conversation about domestic violence.”); Mills, supra note 164, at 557 R
(“After years of indifference to intimate abuse, many state actors now respond uniformly to
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the District of Columbia now treat domestic violence as an actionable
criminal offense.191  Similar arguments could now be successful in this
context.
The domestic violence criminalization movement should, at the
same time, serve as a cautionary tale.192  Although advocates were
successful in achieving criminalization, they did not adequately fore-
see the collateral consequences of prosecutors pursuing domestic vio-
lence as a crime like any other crime.  Committed against an intimate
partner, spouse, coparent, or relative, domestic violence involves com-
plex interpersonal dynamics, and unlike most violence perpetrated
against strangers, domestic violence implicates a broad range of peo-
ple and considerations.  After decades of more aggressive prosecution
of domestic violence, advocates—who became more attentive to the
complex interpersonal dynamics—began pushing prosecutors to con-
sider issues such as the victims’ preferences for or against prosecu-
tion,193 the children involved in the relationship,194 and the effect of
crimes between domestic partners, an approach that eliminates both the state actor’s discretion
and the victim’s desires from the state’s decisionmaking [process.]”).
191. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (providing an example of a state, Mississippi, R
that makes domestic violence an actionable criminal offense).
192. See Kohn, supra note 188, at 212–16 (arguing that the success of advocates’ efforts to
have the state consider domestic violence as a crime like any other crime ultimately compro-
mised the agency of victims in the system); Victoria Law, Against Carceral Feminism, TRUTHOUT
(Oct. 24, 2014, 11:27 AM), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/27028-against-carceral-feminism
(arguing that the feminist movement that lobbied for the criminalization against domestic vio-
lence did not sufficiently consider the consequences for low-income women and domestic vio-
lence victims generally).
193. See Kohn, supra note 188, at 240–44 (analyzing and critiquing the effect of mandatory
interventions on victims); Rene´e Ro¨mkens, Law as a Trojan Horse: Unintended Consequences of
Rights-Based Interventions To Support Battered Women, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 265, 266–67
(2001) (“From a criminal legal perspective, however, there is a growing acknowledgment among
feminist legal scholars that mandatory arrest and prosecution policies invoke dilemmas and
problems that deserve critical attention when developing policies to help protect victims.”); see
also Bailey, supra note 166, at 1785–86 (arguing that although feminists pushed for state inter- R
vention, they did not consider that many victims did not precisely engage the state to protect
their privacy); Tamara L. Kuennen, “No-Drop” Civil Protection Orders: Exploring the Bounds of
Judicial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 95
(2007) (concluding that civil protection orders can be ineffective when dealing with individuals
who wish to stay together because many judges do not account for a victim’s autonomy or the
nature of the abuser’s violence); Mills, supra note 164, at 595 (arguing that mandatory interven- R
tion policies can replicate a battering dynamic by denying the victim’s agency).
194. See, e.g., Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic Violence: The
Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 18–19 (2001) (stating the
possibility that incarcerating individuals who conduct abuse in front of a child might unnecessa-
rily increase adult victim liability as well as increase the number of child witnesses to a traumatic
degree).
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potential incarceration on the family’s wellbeing.195
Similarly, efforts to equate the violation of the parenting provisions
of a protection order with any other law-breaching conduct must be
accompanied by a discussion of the difference as well.  Given the in-
tertwined relationship between the parties, criminally enforcing the
breach of a parenting time provision may not be appropriate in some
cases.  Sentencing might involve different considerations given the
parenting responsibilities of the parties, the best interests of the chil-
dren, and the preferences of the aggrieved party.
Finally, a legislative initiative might incentivize prosecutors to pur-
sue criminal enforcement of parenting time provisions in protection
orders.  Some states criminalize interference with custody rights—the
conduct involving a party breaching the parenting provision of a pro-
tection order.196  Expanding the prevalence of criminal statutes such
as this could increase criminal enforcement.  At the same time, this
type of enforcement elicits the same concerns about the effect of the
criminal justice system being involved in specific cases and in sentenc-
ing as discussed supra.
Advocacy, consciousness-raising, and legislation could increase the
likelihood of a prosecutorial response to violations of protection order
parenting provisions.  At the same time, any advocacy efforts should
be tempered by an awareness of the criminal justice system’s short-
comings as a response in this context.
2. Contextual Enforcement
Consequently, any effort to increase the likelihood that prosecutors
will deploy their power to enforce parenting provisions must be ac-
companied by a concurrent campaign to encourage prosecutors to
pursue enforcement in a contextual way with appropriate sentencing
recommendations.  As prosecutors’ interests in deploying their en-
195. See, e.g., Thomas L. Kirsch II, Problems in Domestic Violence: Should Victims Be Forced
To Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 383, 414
(2001) (explaining how each domestic violence situation is different, and prosecutors should,
therefore, look to the socioeconomic needs of each victim, the seriousness of the victim’s inju-
ries, and the actual chance that the prosecution will be successful with a low risk of retaliation);
Tamara L. Kuennen, Private Relationships and Public Problems: Applying Principles of Rela-
tional Contract Theory to Domestic Violence, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 532–33 (arguing that no-
drop prosecution policies in domestic violence cases can be problematic because they essentially
end the romantic relationship between the two parties, and this may not serve the family’s par-
ticular economic or familial needs).
196. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-45 (2014) (stating that interference with custody is a fel-
ony); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-501 (2007) (criminalizing interference with custody); IDAHO
CODE § 18-4506 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-631 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-306
(2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.03 (West 2011).
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forcement power increases, so too must their attentiveness to the spe-
cific context of these breaches.  By talking with the aggrieved parties
and understanding their preferences, the finances of the family, the
context and breadth of the breach, and the best interests of the child,
the prosecutor can more contextually and effectively use her discre-
tion to pursue criminal enforcement.
C. The Power of Aggrieved Parties and Relief Reconsidered
Aggrieved parties, who have both the most incentive and the access
to relevant information, should have more meaningful power to en-
force the parenting provisions of the protection orders than the courts
grant them.  For protected parties to garner more power in the crimi-
nal realm, their access to the criminal justice system should be ex-
panded generally and their influence on charging and sentencing
should also be fortified.  Civilly, while aggrieved parties hold the
power to pursue enforcement actions, limitations on relief should be
minimized through statutory guidance to make that power more effec-
tive.  These results could be achieved through a range of legislative,
regulatory, and advocacy initiatives.
1. Reducing Barriers to the Criminal Justice System
To address the limitations on aggrieved parties who want to use the
criminal justice system to enforce their parenting provisions within
protection orders, barriers to accessing that system should be reduced.
First, although the progeny of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Robertson
opinion eliminated the private right of action for criminal contempt
the District of Columbia, that prohibition did not eradicate an ag-
grieved party’s right of action nationwide.  The issue is still very much
in flux.  As discussed supra, although some jurisdictions previously re-
quired that the state must prosecute criminal contempts,197 a fair num-
ber of states have not addressed the issue either by common law or
statute.198  In these states, legislatures could codify a private right of
action for aggrieved parties to prosecute criminal contempt.199  Al-
197. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. R
198. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. R
199. Since Robertson, commentators have agreed to argue the importance and constitutional
viability of the private right of action for criminal contempt. See, e.g., Patel, supra note 67, at 164 R
(noting that “permitting private, interested prosecution is consistent with sound public policy of
guaranteeing that victims are not deprived of court-ordered protections[,]” and “the interested
party is in the best position to be aware of the contempt[,]” making private prosecution “proper
[and] also favorable”); Note, Permitting Private Initiation of Criminal Contempt Proceedings, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1492 (2011) (finding multiple reasons why an individual should be able to
initiate a private right of action because police enforcement and “public prosecutions of CPO
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though the Robertson rationale suggests that some jurisdictions will
refuse to provide this right, others may grant this power to aggrieved
parties along with those jurisdictions that already do so.200
Short of a recognized private right of action, aggrieved parties
should be granted access to the criminal justice system by the ability
to initiate criminal contempt proceedings.  In some states, aggrieved
parties enjoy a clear right to initiate proceedings by filing a motion, a
criminal complaint,201 or another procedural document, such as an ap-
plication for a show cause order.202  With this filing, the party can at
least seek the attention of the judge or the prosecutor.  Other jurisdic-
tions either fail to explicitly set forth a procedure for initiating a crimi-
nal contempt case203 or restrict that right to the judge or
prosecution.204  Without this right, those holding court-ordered pro-
tection have little hope of criminal enforcement.  The right to initiate
a case is a critical entitlement to ensure that victims of domestic vio-
lence access to justice and the hope of reifying the promise of their
protection orders.
Finally, to provide aggrieved parties with at least some influence on
the criminal justice system, prosecutors should facilitate their involve-
ment in the sentencing process.  As discussed supra, prosecutors
should be educated about the merits of considering the complaining
witnesses’ perspective on this complex dynamic and encouraged to
consider that perspective.  In addition, advocates could press prosecu-
tors to seek out meaningful input from complaining witnesses in vic-
tim witness statements or in sentencing hearings.
2. Rendering Civil Relief More Effective
Although aggrieved parties hold the power to enforce a protection
order through civil contempt, the effectiveness of that action is se-
verely limited by legal constraints on the relief.  Judges are either con-
strained by the law of civil contempt in awarding remedies or they
choose to limit their own discretion in a way that often fails to provide
violations are often unreliable[,]” and this unreliability creates less incentive “to press charges
for protective order violations”).
200. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (noting that the repercussions of Robertson R
are unknown because the case fails to have precedential value).
201. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting that in Robertson, the district court R
permitted the aggrieved party to privately prosecute criminal contempt).
202. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-1204a (2007).
203. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (noting that in some states, courts have per- R
mitted a  interested, private party to prosecute crimes).
204. See supra notes 106 and accompanying text (discussing how a significant number of juris- R
dictions explicitly prohibit private prosecution of criminal contempt cases).
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relief that is responsive to violations of parenting time provisions.
Those limitations should be addressed through legislation so that ag-
grieved parties can more effectively enforce their court-granted relief.
Providing a statutory right of enforcement short of contempt that enu-
merates remedies—an approach taken in the domestic relations con-
text in some jurisdictions—should be effective in this context.
Alternatively, domestic relations or domestic violence legislation
could provide more guidance on relief in civil contempt cases.
a. Civil Enforcement
Some jurisdictions have sought to provide parties with specific stat-
utory enforcement actions short of contempt for the violation of cus-
tody and visitation orders.  These statutory provisions, which are often
included in the states’ general custody statutes, provide explicit en-
forcement mechanisms for aggrieved parties so that they can move on
their own to effectively address breaches of custody and visitation
provisions without turning to contempt remedies.205  These statutes
provide aggrieved parties with a specific right of action that they can
pursue without government action and that is not hampered by the
ordinary civil contempt doctrines that might limit relief.
For example, a Delaware statute provides that if a court, after a
hearing, has determined that a party has “violated, interfered with,
impaired or impeded the rights of a parent or a child with respect to
the exercise of” visitation, custody, or other contact with the child,
then it may impose specific sanctions or grant enumerated reme-
dies.206  The sanctions include a fine assessed against the interfering
parent that is calculated based on the interested parent’s child support
obligation.207  Under the statute, the aggrieved parent is also entitled
to a combination of extra visitation to make up for lost visits, or a
temporary transfer of custody for up to thirty days, and other relief
granted at the judge’s discretion.208  A Colorado statute provides an
even more extensive array of relief, including an order that requires
205. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129.5 (2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 727–28
(2009); MINN. STAT. § 518.175(6) (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN § 2A:34-23.3 (West 2010); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 20-2-204 (2014); see also Mahoney, supra note 71, at 855–56 (discussing the recent advent R
of remedies embedded in custody statutes addressing relief for violations of custody and visita-
tion orders).
206. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 728(b).
207. Id. § 728(b)(3).
208. Id. §§ 728(b)(1)–(2).
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parent education program attendance, family counseling, custody
modification, and the imposition of a civil fine.209
These specific provisions for enforcement actions and the enumera-
tion of broad available remedies should be included in protection or-
der statutes.  With this statutory authorization, aggrieved parties could
enforce breached custody and visitation provisions without the com-
plications inherent in civil contempt law and in pursuit of remedies
that seek to further the child’s best interest and future compliance
with judicial orders.
b. Civil Contempt
Alternatively, some jurisdictions have enacted specific statutes that
set forth specific enumerated relief in civil contempt cases for the vio-
lation of general custody and visitation orders.210  In Louisiana, for
example, the statute sets forth replacement visitation days, parent ed-
ucation attendance, counseling, and attorneys’ fees as alternatives or
additions to jail time when the court holds a contemnor in civil con-
tempt for breaching a custody or visitation order.211  Michigan supple-
ments those forms of relief by suspending occupational or driver’s
licenses and placing the parent under supervision until he completes
substance abuse counseling programs, mandating that the parent en-
gages in job seeking efforts, and facilitating make-up parenting
time.212
The rationale behind the statutes is sound because the statutes give
the judge specific authorization to grant appropriate relief that will
correct past and coerce future compliance and compensate the ag-
grieved parent.  Judges have implicit authority to grant this relief but
are often reluctant to do so without explicit statutory authorization.213
209. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129.5.  It is important to note that failure to comply with a
protection order’s provisions regarding custody and visitation may be relevant to a subsequent
case for permanent custody.  Under the considerations set forth for courts to determine custody,
this conduct might well be admissible and extremely probative.
210. Mahoney, supra note 71, at 854–55 (discussing statutes that set forth remedies for civil R
contempt for violating a custody or visitation order); see, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-17-4-8 (2008);
IOWA CODE § 598.23 (2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:4611 (2012); ME. STAT. tit. 19, § 1653 (2015);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.644 (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.400 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 125C.030 (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.031 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 603
(2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.160 (2015).
211. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4611(d)–(e).
212. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.644(2).
213. D.C. Act of July 12, 1982, D.C. L. No. 4-144, §§ 4–6 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE
§ 16-1003 to -1005 (2009)) (stating that under the prior version of the statute, judges were reluc-
tant to award relief that was not specifically enumerated despite their authority to do so under a
broad catch-all clause).
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Analogous statutory guidance in protection order statutes, if of-
fered nationwide, could provide holders of protection orders with the
potential for more effective enforcement mechanisms and a more se-
cure reliance on orders’ dictates.  Statutory enumeration of relief
would also clarify the purpose of civil contempt so that there is no
ambiguity that the action is intended to coerce and compensate.214
3. Individual Advocacy
Advocates could enhance protected parties’ access to compensation
for breaches by drafting self-activating remedies in protection orders.
For example, a protection order could include a clause mandating that
if the respondent fails to return the child from visitation within a cer-
tain amount of time after the agreed upon time, or if he fails to pro-
duce a child according to the order, then the aggrieved party may
unilaterally take additional visitation hours with the child or may re-
fuse to produce the child for the next visitation.  This type of clause
would obviate the need for future court enforcement.  However, it
would be effective, of course, only if the protected party had enough
access to the child to take advantage of those remedies.
Further, advocates could encourage protected parties to seek long-
term domestic relations orders to supplement the relief in their pro-
tection orders.  Although long-term custody orders granted by domes-
tic relations courts also suffer from underenforcement, statutory
guidance to judges about appropriate remedies for violations is far
more prevalent, rendering it more likely that judges will grant effec-
tive relief.215
4. Relief Consistent With The Best Interests of the Child
Ultimately, any relief granted to compensate an aggrieved party for
violations of a parenting time order should be consistent with the best
interests of the child because the relief involves the well-being of chil-
dren.  Imposing a statutory best interest consideration would be con-
sistent with other legal doctrines because the law consistently provides
judges with the opportunity to consider standards that give their de-
terminations integrity and effectiveness.216
214. See supra Section III.B.2 (discussing how some jurisdictions fail to recognize the dual
purpose of civil contempt, which is to enforce compliance with a court order and compensate for
losses related to the noncompliance).
215. See supra Section III.C.3 (discussing that judges are not provided any specific direction
about the range of relief to enforce custody and visitation provisions of protection orders).
216. David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CALIF. L. REV. 937,
992 (1990) (“Without the guidance of formal legal standards, and with only broad notions of
policy and the judge’s own conscience to guide the judge’s decision, the likelihood of inconsis-
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This context is no exception.  Even when granting enumerated stat-
utory remedies in civil contempt cases, the judge should be mandated
to consider the best interests of the child.  Would it be in that child’s
best interest to change physical custody?  What effect would granting
the father two consecutive weeks of parenting time to compensate for
fourteen days withheld by the mother over a six-month period have
on the child?  Protection order statutes should include a direct man-
date to consider the child’s well-being when considering appropriate
relief in a civil contempt case.
This range of reforms could make real and useful the power that
various system actors and litigants have to enforce the custody and
parenting time provisions of protection orders.  Any effort to sharpen
enforcement of domestic relations provisions of protection orders,
however, must also be attentive to collateral consequences for the
beneficiaries of those orders.  Sometimes a parent will withhold
parenting time from the other parent not to harass that parent or chal-
lenge the order’s effectiveness, but to protect a child or the party her-
self.  Enforcement mechanisms must take into account defenses for
parents who exercise good-faith efforts to protect their children.217
In addition, fortifying enforcement mechanisms also runs the risk of
providing abusive parents with an additional avenue by which to har-
ass the other parent.218  As one commentator noted: “Threatened or
tency and unfairness is immeasurably increased.”); see Nancy Lee Firak & Kimberly A.
Schmaltz, Air Rage: Choice of Law for Intentional Torts Occurring in Flight over International
Waters, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1, 66 (1999) (discussing that courts have found that current legal stan-
dards in admiralty jurisdictions, like the locality test, should remain the legal standard because
incorporating a “factors-based test” would be “hard to apply, jettisoning relative predictability”
(quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547 (1995)));
Raymond A. Catanzano, Enforcement of Support Awards in Matrimonial Actions: The Need for
Uniformity, AM. BAR ASS’N GPSOLO EREPORT (May 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/publica
tions/gpsolo_ereport/2014/may_2014/enforcement_support_awards_matrimonial_actions_need_
uniformity.html.  Courts impose different sanctions on the noncustodial parents when they failed
to pay their child support, creating inconsistency in family court: “Cooperative uniformity in the
enforcement of [child] support orders [through uniform law] between the states is essential.” Id.
217. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4506(2)(a) (2015) (codifying that it is an affirmative de-
fense to a prosecution for interference with custody if the defendant is acting to protect a child);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-306(c)(1) (2010); see also Janet M. Bowermaster, Relocation Custody
Disputes Involving Domestic Violence, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 433, 451 (1998) (explaining that in
some instances of extreme violence, mothers may violate a custody order and flee the state out
of fear of physical abuse or even murder); Tarr, supra note 63, at 43–48 (stating that because R
batterers can misuse the protection order system and because challenging these decisions in
court can be prohibitively emotionally and financially challenging, some victims may flee the
state and avoid the process entirely).
218. Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the
Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 24 (2004)
(stating that batterers engage in a “race to the courthouse” to obtain a civil protection order
against their spouse by asserting that all of the abuse has actually happened to the batterer);
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actual litigation regarding custody or visitation can become a critical
avenue for the batterer to maintain control after separation.”219  Fur-
ther, experts who study abusive fathers note the prevalence of custody
litigation in the context of domestic violence.220  They also note the
frequent success221 of abusive fathers in strategically manipulating the
system to use custody litigation to their advantage.222  Any initiative
creating private rights of action to enforce custody and visitation pro-
visions in protection orders should include safeguards to protect par-
ties from harassing litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
All court orders should make good on their promise of enforceabil-
ity.  Parties should be able to rely on injunctions that are validly issued
to protect their legal rights and safety.  If a protected party can prove
that the opposing party violated the court order, she should be enti-
tled to her day in court and to meaningful relief to compensate for the
violation.  This is not the case.  Civil injunctions are often unenforced,
and the problem is particularly acute in the enforcement of domestic
relations provisions in protection orders.  Immediate attention should
George Lardner, Jr., Opinion, Beating the System, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1993, http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1993/08/01/beating-the-system/8a3fba5b-9c62-41b8-8716-5b11
db56b92e/ (explaining that batterers use intimidation tactics to intimidate individuals within the
legal system, such as lawyers and jurors, in order to further marginalize victims and gain the
upper hand in custody disputes); Mary Przekop, Student Scholarship, One More Battleground:
Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and the Batterer’s Relentless Pursuit of Their Victims Through
the Courts, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1053, 1058–93 (2011) (explaining how batterers can
continually file motions and claims against their victim to maintain control and create a culture
of emotional instability over the victim for years); Lundy Bancroft, Understanding the Batterer in
Custody and Visitation Disputes, LUNDY BANCROFT (1998), http://www.lundybancroft.com/arti-
cles/understanding-the-batterer-in-custody-and-visitation-disputes (stating that when batterers
feel as if they are losing, they can use threats of violence or retaliation to intimidate women to
drop legal disputes or even make the victims’s attorneys fear for their own personal safety); Amy
Barasch, Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, SLATE (Feb. 19, 2015, 9:30 AM), http://www
.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/02/domestic_violence_protection_vic
tims_need_civil_courts_and_lawyers.html (arguing that because batterers are both manipulative
and abusive, they use abusive litigation methods to establish more control over their partners).
219. Tarr, supra note 63, at 61 (citing LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BAT- R
TERER AS PARENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS
98 (2002)).
220. See, e.g., BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 219, at 98. R
221. See id. at 98 (noting that abusive fathers are more likely than non-battering fathers to
seek custody and that they have an advantage over battered women in winning in a contested
custody case); supra note 63 and accompanying text (explaining that it is a well-documented R
tactic of the abuser to unlawfully withhold children from women).
222. See BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 219, at 22–128 (discussing an abuser’s manipu- R
lative tactics and attitudes towards victims of domestic violence); supra note 63 and accompany- R
ing text (noting that abusers may unlawfully withhold children from women to exert control over
them).
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be focused on the enforcement of the parenting time provisions within
protection orders because of the particular confluence of historical,
economic, and legal influences that result in prodigious under enforce-
ment and ineffective enforcement of this relief.  The lack of effective
enforcement of these orders not only undermines the faith of litigants
in the justice system, but also puts them and their families at risk of
violence and dangerous instability.  Reforms in this area of particu-
larly extreme underenforcement should have an influence on enforce-
ment of all civil injunctions so that they can deliver on their
assurances of just and reliable resolution, shoring up the legal system
and its role in resolving conflicts.
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